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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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16 December 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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BULGARIA

NEW PRECISION WEAPONS, NEW FORMS OF WARFARE EXAMINED

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 16 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Docent Nesho Neshev, candidate of military sciences: "Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Country's Defensive Might"]

[Text] At the February (1985) Plenum of the BCP Central Committee Comrade Todor Zhivkov pointed out, "It must be clear to everybody that the scientific and technical revolution is of decisive significance--economically, politically, ideologically--from the point of view not only of our domestic development and the defense of socialism, but also from the viewpoint of international relations.

"The scientific and technical revolution is the key and--what is more--the superkey to our socioeconomic development."

The successful development of science and technology naturally gives rise to revolutionary changes in military matters, as well as definitively influencing the armament of the armies and the fleet, the techniques and forms of armed combat, and the methods of training and inculcation of the Armed Forces.

Most Important Factors

The most important factors characterizing the revolution in military matters are the creation of nuclear weapons, missiles as the means for delivering them, the automation of guidance systems and rapid space penetration.

The creation of nuclear missileery as a new weapon system not only gives rise to a new category of armed forces--strategic missile troops, but also necessitates a revaluation of all areas of military science and raises entirely new problems for solution. It has toppled the obsolete ideas regarding the speed of phenomena and processes in warfare, the role of space and time, the scale and destructiveness of armed combat. The problems of operational efficiency, stability, continuity and security of troop control have arisen with great acuteness.

Scientific and technical progress has likewise given mighty impetus to the development of the conventional means of combat. Their combat power is growing

very rapidly. For example, the fire power of the rocket launcher has doubled in comparison with the Great Patriotic War, while the penetrative power of anti-tank weapons has increased several fold. The rate of fire and accuracy of small arms, artillery and antiaircraft artillery weapons have grown significantly. All this has resulted in a speedy enhancement of the firing, striking and maneuvering capabilities of troops and enabled them to be assigned more decisive and in-depth missions in action without the use of nuclear weapons.

Features of Scientific and Technical Progress in Military Science

Three features mark the scientific and technical revolution's penetration of military science.

The first involves acceleration of the obsolescence of the various models of weapons and combat materiel. For example, in the past 10-15 years two or three generations of missiles have come and gone; the aircraft fleet and underwater and surface fighting ships have been almost entirely updated; antiaircraft missile systems and radar sets, means of communication and guidance have changed several times.

The second feature is evinced, apart from the creation of qualitatively new combat materiel, in the extensive modernization of existing weapon models through enhancement of their combat characteristics in keeping with modern requirements.

The third feature involves the great exacerbation of the rivalry between offensive and defensive weapon systems. For a certain time the race to create offensive weapons results in certain difficulties in finding adequately effective means of defense. For example, there is still no sure means of defense against nuclear missiles and this is turned to account by the U.S. warmongers as grounds for continuing the armament race, for endeavoring to design space weapons for building a global antimissile defense

Ways of Affecting Defensive Might

Scientific and technical progress affects the defensive might of the socialist countries in several ways.

It intensifies very much man's role in modern warfare. New weapons and combat materiel are, with the help of engineering psychology and ergonomics, adaptable to human capabilities but at the same time imperatively require the formation of new capabilities in man himself in order to perform the complex intellectual operator's job during the combat employment of modern weapons and combat materiel. High special training, the creative capability to solve practical problems, stable morale and marked responsibility must be acquired in the individual fighting man for the performance of the combat missions of gun crews, ship and aircraft crews, subunits and units. The operation and combat employment of some gun systems are so complex and science-intensive they either require the enlistment of scientists or make it imperative that the commanders and engineers among them advance themselves in their training to the level of scientists.

Scientific and technical progress highly affects the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. The appearance of new, more highly improved weapons and combat materiel gives rise to the creation of new categories of armed forces, branches and special troops. This is confirmed by the appearance of missile troops, antiaircraft missile troops, radio troops, electronic countermeasures units and formations, etc.

The comprehensive automation and mechanization characteristic of scientific and technical progress have had a substantial, revolutionizing effect on troop control systems. The gradual adoption of automation facilities and office machinery has not only expanded the capabilities of the control agencies to store, process and transmit information about the situation, but has also resulted in the appearance of ASUV's [avtomatiziraniye sistemi za upravleniye na voyskite; automated troop control systems]. They have as their purpose to heighten operational efficiency and continuity in troop control, effectiveness in the use of weapons and combat materiel and, on the whole, the combat readiness of troops. ASUV's, however, must not be pitted against man or turned into a fetish. The Marxist-Leninist thesis of man's decisive role in war must be well understood. Only man with his creative capacities is in a position to perceive and assess the slightest details of the situation, detect discrepancies, formulate a design and make a decision in a complex indeterminate situation. Even with the highest degree of automation the commander will remain the central figure in the control system, and the staff the main control body.

Scientific and technical progress profoundly affects also the development of military science. The latter receives new ways and means and research problems, generated by the updated weapons and combat materiel. Socialist military science studies the effect of the combat-materiel factor on modern warfare, the conditions under which it arises and its duration. It does not absolutize the might of nuclear missilery and anticipates that if the imperialists happen to unleash a world war, that war will be characterized by active and decisive operations of all branches of the armed forces, coordinated in objectives, place and time. On behalf of the common objectives every category of the armed forces and branch of the army will perform its distinctive combat missions with the utmost exertion. Nor must it be forgotten that military theory and practice in their turn affect progress in combat materiel, giving it a purposeful character.

Character, Preparation, Conduct of Combat Operations

The achievements of scientific and technical progress exert a powerful influence also on the character, preparation and conduct of combat operations.

The increased capabilities of weapons systems and continuous improvement of technical and rear-area support, the introduction of counterelectronic measures and automation of the control of combat means and troops have given rise to the advent of a qualitatively new combat-materiel basis of modern combat operations on a tactical, operational and strategic scale. The necessity arises of reassessing a number of theoretical theses, criteria and principles in the military art. Beyond dispute is intensification of the role of the

fire fight, which takes on great depth, continuity and decisiveness. The idea of in-depth fire destruction, realized to a depth of 300 km or more, compels recognition. Within the limits of the fire fight, massed fire blows will be inflicted which will put out of action all elements of the antitank-forces formation and create fire breaches.

In-depth fire destruction and fire fights open up the way for conducting in-depth combat operations. Combined still better among these will be fire, attack and maneuver, with fire having the leading role. A rapid breakthrough through the enemy defense and exploitation of the success by means of bold raid operations of mobile units and formations will be sought. These mobile units and formations will operate at a significant distance apart and in separate directions if the flanks and rear are exposed. Under such complex conditions wide scope is created for officers and all personnel to display creativity and initiative in employing the boldest and most unexpected modes of operation: infliction of in-depth fire attacks, wide maneuvering with fire and varied raid operations disorganizing the enemy's plans and fighting ranks. Very often operations will pass from the defensive to the offensive and back; efforts will rapidly shift from one direction to another promising success.

The appearance of the air echelon of troops is beginning to have a great effect on military operations. It is in a position to take advantage without delay of the results of in-depth fire attack to gain command of important regions and positions and to conduct active operations deep in the enemy's rear in close cooperation with penetrating raiding parties. Thus a genuine, actively operating front is created in the enemy's rear. Commanders of combined-arms units must be trained to be organizers of air-to-ground combat operations, in which use will be made of air envelopments, helicopter battles, combined fire destruction from the air and ground, air-borne operations in great depth.

Scientific and technical progress makes possible wide use of varied radio electronic systems and facilities, electron-optical, laser and television devices to preserve stability of the control of one's own troops and combat means and for the radio electronic silencing of the enemy's radio electronic systems and facilities. A need is emerging for the conversion of supporting radio electronic equipment into very effective electronic countermeasures. The experience of local servicemen unequivocally shows this. Electronic countermeasures are making their way as a mandatory measure into all types of combat operations.

The new means of armed combat will also affect some of the basic principles of the military art. In particular, the mass application of high-speed weapons will intensify the role of surprise in combat operations; the principle of the concentration of efforts will be implemented according to a new method. The role of the moral and psychological training of troops to endure long fire destruction will increase markedly, as will the selection of effective methods for operations in a complex situation, the control of highly mobile operations over a great space, etc.

A number of changes will ensue in the substance and methods of work of commanders and staffs in the training and conduct of combat operations. In these

operations there will be an intensification of the role of initiative and creativity in the search for original, more effective methods of smashing the enemy and destroying him by fire, in the definition of the combat missions of units and formations, in the organization of coordinated action and comprehensive combat and operations support.

The interrelationships between tactics and the other components of the military art (operational art and strategy), between offensive and defensive combat operations, etc., need to be significantly reassessed.

In response to scientific and technical progress serious changes will occur in the combat operations and troops of the PVO [antiaircraft defense] and VMF [navy]. One can already with good reason speak of the new tactics of air, air-defense and sea battles.

By virtue of the updating of weapons and combat materiel, scientific and technical progress powerfully affects the country's defensive might and gives rise to a host of new problems to be solved in the military art of the categories of armed forces. This objective pattern of our social development imperatively requires the entire activity of commanders, staffs, political organizers, party and Komsomol organizations to be erected on the basis of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution in the fullest correspondence with the requirements thereof.

6474

CSO: 2200/30

BULGARIA

USE OF NEBULOUS LANGUAGE TO COVER UP SHORTCOMINGS CONDEMNED

Sofia NOVO VREME in Bulgarian No 9, 1985 pp 123-124

[Letter to the editor by Khristo Rednev, journalist, newspaper ZNAME NA KOMUNIZMA, Turgovishte, dated 13 July 1985: "Language and Efficiency"]

[Text] Not so long ago, in its Friday presentation "A Conversation With You," in its "Horizon" program, Radio Sofia broadcast an interview between its correspondent in Burgas and a local Balkanturist manager. The topic was "What Is New in the Southern Black Sea Coast in Servicing Summer Tourists." The comrade official answered the question by engaging in extensive descriptions of the comprehensive programs adopted by the management relative to new structures, recategorizing establishments, etc.

It was precisely at this point that Bozhana Dimitrova, who was directing the broadcast from the studio, lost patience and inventively interrupted the verbose manager by asking the following question:

"Nevertheless, comrade, could you tell us where a person could find an inexpensive restaurant with fast service?"

No clear and specific answer followed this clear and specific question. Matters were once again glossed over with general statements in the sense that here and there something had been done; promises of future good intentions and plans were given, and so on and so forth.

I like to listen to such discussions which radiojournalists conduct "live" with various economic and other managers in the capital and the rest of the country. On virtually all such occasions I develop the feeling that there is a lack of contact in such interesting and topical dialogues. Quite frequently it is as though both sides are speaking in different tongues. This impression was entirely confirmed in a "Wednesday Meetings" transmission, in the course of which my colleagues from the "Horizon" program talked with a manager (a deputy director, I believe) of the BAN [Bulgarian Academy of Sciences] Institute on Water Resource Utilization (I am not sure that this is its correct name). The manager kept answering the questions in such a way that her answers needed decoding for the ordinary listener to understand what was actually being discussed. Although she was prompted by the journalist that in

this case a strictly scientific linguistic style was not proper, the official's answers mercilessly continued in the same spirit.

It was obvious that the comrade in question (who, unquestionably, knew her job quite well) was simply unable to restructure, to express her thoughts in a manner which would make it more accessible and understandable to the nonspecialist.

I have attended party and other meetings in labor and worker collectives. I have always been impressed by the fact that workers, people directly engaged in production, speak out briefly, name things by their true names and try to be precise and specific to the extent of their linguistic training. Briefly, they speak in a businesslike manner and say nothing unnecessary. Naturally, exceptions exist as well but they are instead dictated by a lack of understanding, a certain conformism, the desire to imitate superiors, etc. As a rule, however, people in management and specialists express themselves in "chosen words" (as the lyrics of a song go), trying to prove their "scientific training" at all cost; occasionally they speak in general terms, glossing over and twisting matters around in dealing with questions they find uncomfortable or touchy.

I do not know whether I personally express myself with sufficient clarity. Unquestionably, however, an impersonal, repelling and not particularly effective linguistic style has found its place in party political work and in the other areas of the social management system in our country. The specific study of this style is the job of specialists in the field. My modest purpose here is to voice the opinion that this style significantly reduces the efficiency of our political, ideological, organizational, educational and all other activities in which party, social, economic and state leading bodies and cadres are engaged.

What is the influence on the listeners (readers) of impersonal expressions such as "major weaknesses were allowed to occur," "a comprehensive program was formulated," "prompt measures were taken," "tremendous political work was carried out," etc., etc., which crowd our reports, information and statements? Where is the specific person who has carried out such actions? Who is he? No answer is given. Everything takes place in general. Let us not even mention the disgusting (forgive the expression!) cliches with which people have long become fed up. I could cite many other similar examples.

Unquestionably, today's language and linguistic style in the area of social management in itself causes substantial harm. The question, however, has another side as well. Language, as we know, does not exist for its own sake. It is the external manifestation of the mind. Consequently, poor, inexpressive and impersonal language is a confirmation of the existence of a poor, impersonal and inexpressive mind. Such a mind, in turn, indicates a similar style of action. All of this is counterindicated to and incompatible with a true businesslike style of work and management, for lack of specificity, clarity and precision. Truth is being concealed and drowned in verbosity. Language and thought stereotypes betray spiritual laziness, which is quite distant from and opposite to creativity and revolutionism....

"My father was beating us a great deal. If we were even a little bit late, my brother and I did not dare to come home.... Mother could not protect us, for he beat her as well. I began to drop out of school too, for it was nicer and more interesting on the outside and I was little.... In the 6 years I have spent in the TVU my mother and father have come for a visit only once.

"The only person on whom I can rely and I know loves me is my grandmother. She loves my brothers too. One of them is 18 and the other 16. They too are in a TVU but do not run away. They behave in a model fashion. I do not intend to go back. I would like to be like them, not to run away.... I had almost succeeded. My educator in Slavovitsa is a very honest person. I also liked the principal.... However, they lied to me. They promised me that if I mended my ways I would be released from the school. I did try. For the first time I really tried. My grade at the end of the year was 5.45. I had not scored a single negative mark since the new year. Finally, the teachers' council not only did not free me but did not even allow me to go on vacation. I was not told the reason why. I may have done something wrong now but at least I will know why I am being punished."

The mother: "I no longer know what this child deserves and the type of difficulties in which he has involved us. It was he who led on his older brothers and that is why I personally signed for him to go to a TVU, so that they would no longer be around him. He has his friends and feels good only when he is with them. He claimed to have decided to mend his ways, now that he is already 14 years old. The school sent us a form to fill out, asking us whether we agreed to take him back, but did not release him. This made him angry and he escaped once again.... Do I love him? I do not hate him despite all the things that he has done to us...."

The protection and love of the mother and the home has been lost. Has it ever existed in this boy's case?

The investigator: "In the 20 days during which he was free, together with other children he stole from citizens' houses. The manner in which he escaped was remarkable. During the night he came across a bus not far from Slavovitsa and drove it to Sofia. The bus is in working order and the boy caused no accidents, despite driving it at night in the rain...."

Did the TVU educators in Slavovitsa act properly by deciding that the boy not only did not deserve at that point the privilege of being free but even a vacation? Apparently, yes. They had no faith in their pupil and his change and...however unfair this may seem, they turned out to be right. But why is it that I somehow did not like their rightness and that my feeling for justice, strangely enough, as it happened with the boy, suggested to me that they were to be blamed for these 20 days of stolen vacation during which he was unable to prove that he had grown up and had become a new person?

5003

CSO: 2200/23

HUNGARY

STUDENTS ANGRY OVER SHRINKING STIPENDS, BENEFITS

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 5 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Aranka Rehak: "Gross Anger, Net Rage"]

[Text] State support of university students does not guard its real value in spite of the resolutions. Thus the students become very indignant when they feel that the little they have is endangered. Especially if responsible parties fail to notice in time the connection between the verification of income and the socialist support of students.

The universities and high schools got into trouble with the payment of socialist support. In several places--as customary at the beginning of the year--they started to distribute the advances when they came to their senses: something was not in order around the verification of incomes. That is, since 1 January--according to the changed rules regarding the calculation of food money--the parents' net income must be shown to determine child and educational compensation fees. The same kind of income verification is needed for students, and these should already have been taken to the universities and high schools. The institutions sent the papers to the ministry of education, where they were processed, and the framework of socialist aid due each institution was calculated. However in August the minister of finance--thinking of the approaching payments--again called attention to the fact that net income must be shown on the verifications. In the institutions of higher education the students kept appearing with altered verifications. In time a circular from the ministry of education arrived as well: It would be unfair if they considered net income for one student and gross income for another for the calculation of socialist aid, therefore everyone must be given the uniform opportunity to verify his income after deducting general income tax and retirement.

"We were nearly swept away by "public anger" at the conference of those responsible for the interests of the Hungarian Communist Youth League committees in mid September," says Ferenc Rakosi, co-worker of the Hungarian Communist Youth League Central Committee. "They were angry that socialist support must be redistributed; many also flew into a rage because they had to travel home for their income verification, since they did not trust that it would arrive in time by mail. But the atmosphere was mostly peppered because the information was late. In a few places they posted the letter from the Ministry of Education, in many places not even that. And not everyone received our newsletter either."

Laszlo Furedi, the former protector of the interests of the Technical University of Budapest also participated in this conference.

"The students were chased into unnecessary excess work," he says. "But we must play with the numbers until the same people receive approximately the same socialist support. Namely the circle of authorized persons has not changed, nor the divisible money. Then what was all this good for? But so much for us. I saw with my own eyes at the conference the paper of the Medical University of Debrecen: with reference to this, they had not even paid the People's Republic's tuition. They also complained that a provincial high school wanted to give an advance of 500 forints to everyone uniformly, even those who were due 2000!" Mrs Akos Petho, co-worker at the studies department of the Medical University of Debrecen is still hoarse: in a short period of time four fifths of the students were in and out of her office, expecting information and help.

"We paid the People's Republic's tuitions. Advances could be requested on the social and study tuitions. There simply was no time to distribute the study tuition because of the upset around the income verifications. We are just beginning; from October we will also pay the requested advances on socialist support. Finally tempers cooled."

The new method of income verification brought up several questions. The students began to count. It was not hard to see that the declared income of families with the highest incomes decreased most, while the least difference between reality and theory until now occurred in families with retired parents. The ranking of college applicants was still based on summer returns: and it is unknown how the properly and improperly filled out papers were mixed among them.

Something had to be done while the questions multiplied. As a temporary solution--until the arrival of the new, uniform income verifications--the institutions will distribute 90 percent of the scope intended for socialist support. Thus for September, October and November the students will receive--on the average--90 percent of last year's support. However, in December the students will receive the newly divided socialist support based on the new verifications; the remainders will also be payable then.

"This matter has caused us no small worry," says Mrs Lajos Nagy, co-worker of the ministry of education. "We must again divide and multiply. About 60 percent of the day-time students are authorized to receive socialist support. They need not fear that because of the redistribution anyone will be at a disadvantage. Everyone can count on approximately the same support they have received until now. And those who accidentally receive a higher advance than the amount shown by the final calculation need not repay the money. The verification of net income is fair, since it reflects the real situation."

Therefore the support remains largely unchanged, no one is short changed, but most of the money is paid before December. This disposition could have been fulfilled more smoothly if the responsible parties had realized in time that not only the day-care children need verification of income, and if they had notified the companies in time to pay attention to this. The students could have received more information from their institutions in time, too. Probably this

wouldn't have changed the protest, the calculation. Because the university students are also sensitive about money. Could they be so materialistic? Perhaps they are forced by the fact that during the past three years the real value of stipends, of state support has decreased.

12932/12274

CSO: 2500/68

HUNGARY

WORKER GUARD RECRUITMENT, MEMBERSHIP, TASKS EXAMINED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Gyorgy Mate: "Candidates for the Worker Guard"]

[Text] During these months the Worker Guard is preparing the reserves for the taking of their solemn oaths in January. The young Worker Guard candidates are fulfilling their party commission by donning the corporation's gray practicing uniform. They felt that this social work was most suited to their capabilities and personalities; the local party organization, to which they submitted their request for admission, found them suitable and worthy for this service. They are now being familiarized with the corporation's traditions and demands. Later they will march out to the field, where the drill-masters will familiarize them with their future arms, battle information and service; with all that they will swear to at the end of their preparation. These few months are important constructive elements in the building of unity. On the effective force board at the end of the year, at the threshold of the New Year change is essential. The names of those demobilized and going into the reserves will be removed. In their place the new generation will fill the void; 4000 new Worker Guards enroll in the corporation annually.

Mission Assumed Under Oath

Adjustment is facilitated by that proverbial common spirit which, since 1957 has forged together the volunteer armed forces of the Hungarian working people. This has increasingly more visible signs. In the Gyor county Rabapordany the Worker Guard subunit leased a sugar beet field from the co-operative, from which the profits are spent on public trips and actions. In Mateszalka the unit helps those who build--during the past two years 15 Worker Guards acquired homes this way. The new ones undertake service for five years. But the majority stay longer. They grow to love the community so well, that it becomes an organic part of their lives--by no means will they renounce it at the end of five years. The majority of those demobilizing and going into the reserves are forced by circumstances to come to this decision; they request the general meeting, the unit command to release them from service because of advanced age, illness or a change in work circumstances.

Once, in the years following the formation of the unit, fluctuation was much greater. Those older communists who requested and received arms because of the signs of counterrevolutionary danger, gave these to younger ones with the pleasant feeling that they have fulfilled their sworn duties. Others accepted work that required a change in residence, and other circumstances, such that they could not undertake service that required occupation day and night, several times a week. New ones took their place. Some subunits exchange half their number in a year.

Since then the activity of the unit has become consolidated. The majority of the party organizations deal with the selection of Worker Guard candidates according to plan. The Worker Guards assist in this themselves. They increase the interest of their fellow workers by setting an example, and strive to organize their reserves from good workers within or without the Communist party who are politically and morally unobjectionable. It is the rear factory party organization that neglects this educational work. In the wake of the party organization's educational work the effective force is annually brought up to normal strength. Our units turn up in good numbers--mostly in places where revolutionary workers' activity has deep roots--for which there are more suitable applicants than they can accept. Compared to past years there are now more young university students and high school students applying; the ratio of female Worker Guard candidates is up to 10 percent. At these units the applicants are admonished to wait: perhaps in the following years more will be demobilized, then these individuals may enter the unit. What causes concern? First of all, that the effective force is declining in certain industrial branches, and since the greater half of the unit is composed of physical workers, the variety is shrinking as well. In many factories the effective force of workers is behind those that resign. Over the years they have chosen the majority of those who belong in the unit in every respect, and they are looking for suitable men among the new ones. We are speaking of a volunteer armed unit, in which quality must be the primary consideration. The standards must not be lowered under any condition; if this were to happen the main cohesive force would be undermined, the discipline based on principle, morality and politics.

Practice, Occupation

The headquarters and the Worker Guards are well acquainted with the cares of economic leaders. That is why they arrange two thirds of occupations outside of working hours. But it is indispensable that sometimes they must request members of the corporation from work. They usually let the economic leaders know weeks or months ahead of time, that they may replace the departing one, or that they may organize work so that the absence of one or two men will not cause a jolt.

We have numerous factories and institutions where the leader is himself a Worker Guard. Worker's Guard Ferenc Bogner, director general of the Majus 1. Clothing Factory, regularly takes part in every occupation, provides guard. For him this activity means a close connection with the factory workers, it creates an organic part of the work of service. Dr Gyorgy Bolcsey, president of the 21st District Council, representative to the National Assembly, knows the wishes and complaints of his constituents intimately as an assigned Worker Guard--this kind

of regular meeting with the residents of Csepel is of great help to him--and the Worker Guards don't put locks on their lips either when they judge the activity of the Council face to face. Many leaders, even if not Worker Guards, appear at the practice, and talk with the workers belonging to the corporation. There are thousands of workshops and brigades in which both the leaders and workers are proud that a Worker Guard is in their ranks, and if he is called away by the armed corporation, they provide a replacement. The presence of the collective abundantly repays the aid. Most Worker Guards may be ranked among the best from a professional viewpoint; his faithfulness to the company, self-discipline, and collective spirit is exceptional. Most Worker Guards help when the community solves a difficult problem. He deals with inexperienced, new workers, partakes in common social work, as well as in recreation. The Worker Guards' educational work makes its favorable influence felt on the entire collective through individual Worker Guards. If it has enemies, they are from among those who find honest work a burden, and only feel good when they can cheat the greater community. It is true that the Worker Guards are not saints either; clever, undisciplined men may be found among them as well. The behavior of such men could be used by the malicious against the corporation. This is also why the Worker Guard looks after the moral unimpeachability of its ranks with such strictness.

Reciprocal Help

Being conscious of these things, the party organizations deal with--besides education to party membership--the building up of the Worker Guard's effective force. Between 1200 and 1300 non-party Worker Guards request admission to the party annually. The non-party person admitted to the Worker Guard enters a community which in time develops in him those qualities necessary to becoming a communist, among others collectivity, a spirit of reciprocal aid, feeling of responsibility toward society, internationalism, outspokenness, implacability toward faults, and self-criticism. He is among men who do what they have undertaken cheerfully, and gladly acquire the knowledge required for the completion of their assignments. In time, most non-party persons in the atmosphere of the corporation apply for party membership at their place of work.

The difficult economic situation naturally influences the work of education, education toward party membership as well as the building up of the effective force. More effective work requires greater exertion from everyone. However our party membership and our Worker Guard is a trained, prepared community--it is capable of its own continuous rejuvenation even under such circumstances.

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HUNGARY

TRADE UNION WORK AMONG YOUTH DISCUSSED

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 2 Nov 85 p. 7

[Interview with Sandor Nagy, secretary of SZOT, the National Trade Union Council, by Athena Gorog: "Appropriate to Its Traditions"]

[Text] At the 25 October session of the National Trade Union Council, the expansion of trade union work among youth was discussed. A proposal was accepted by the Council involving the related tasks and some organizational measures such as the scope of duties and the sphere of authority of youth sections or youth councils to be formed in the future. We discussed the related trade union agenda with Sandor Nagy, secretary of SZOT.

[Answer] At the June 1983 session of SZOT, the state of youth work by the trade union movement was broadly evaluated and a stand was taken on the problems of its expansion. The 1983 SZOT resolution remains in effect, unchanged; in the near future, its substantial, formal and organizational realization will be undertaken. The essence of the proposal is that the work of trade unions among youth must be strengthened. Accordingly, our goal is to outline more precisely the work of youths gathered in the trade unions (1.5 million youths under 30 years of age are involved) within the trade unions and to provide the appropriate conditions for it. Not in an isolated form but within the framework of the trade union movement, accommodated to its current organizational order. The youth work of the trade union movement has great traditions which put us under obligation. Worthy of these traditions and in their spirit, the trade unions continue with the task of taking in hand and representing the problems and justified demands of youth.

This is not some senseless and baseless favoritism toward an age group. Much rather, the trade union movement too should promote that adequate social support is given to youth for the appropriate evaluation of their actual social and economic weight and role, its material and moral acknowledgement and also for the solution of specific problems appearing at the given period of life. Furthermore, the trade union movement should be more intensively active in the interest of a group representing about a third of its membership. It means that, in national economic plans, in formulating various socio-political conceptions, in educational policy, in resolving occupational problems and in wage measures the situation of youth and the solution of its realistic problems should be given more forceful consideration.

[Question] What organizational changes are referred to and when will they take place?

[Answer] At enterprises and institutions, youth sections will be formed within the basic trade union organizations with automatic membership for every trade union member under 30 years of age. These sections will elect their leadership and, where several youth sections are slated to be formed because of several basic organizations, their work will be coordinated by the institutional or enterprise youth councils. Youth councils will also be formed alongside the central management of SZMTs [Megye Trade Union Councils] and sections, and also at the SZOT level. As to timing: the youth councils working alongside the central leadership of SZMTs and the branches will be elected by the end of January 1986 followed by the election of the National Youth Council at the 25th Congress of Trade Unions. Within a year after the Congress, the youth councils and youth sections at the work places will be established. At the same time, the youth committees will cease to exist.

[Question] What will be the difference between the work of youth councils and youth committees?

[Answer] While the youth committees, commissioned by the executive committee, had the right to propose, to comment and to take initiatives, the youth councils will have an expanded mandate and will work independently on certain problems. Their work will be carried out above all on the basis of resolutions by the executive committee but they will have to report on their work not only to the executive committee but also to the youth. They will also have certain means, including money, for example, the source of which can be: income from social work or the sum currently spent on youth projects from the trade union funds. This must be decided by the given executive level in every case. They will work on the basis of annual work programs and their mandate will include representation, suggestion, evaluation, control as well as coordination involving problems affecting youth and in general everything delegated to them by the given elected body. They will have the right to make decisions concerning problems assigned to them by the executive committee, for example, the use of funds allocated to youth in the budget, problems associated with the organization and mobilization of youth and development of work methods associated with the activities of youth sections and youth councils.

[Question] What is the assurance that it will indeed be so in practice?

[Answer] The assurance is in part political and in part organizational. Currently there is a strong determination in the trade union movement to deal more effectively with the problems of youth. With respect to organizational assurances: the secretary of the youth council will be a member of the executive committee and this by itself will guarantee a regular flow of information. Furthermore, the success of practical work can also be assured by the provision that the youth secretary can be made accountable to the membership at any time.

[Question] Who will become members of the youth councils?

[Answer] If a branch decides that the council consist of the youth secretaries of the sub-branch, it will be done. But if it considers it better to have every professional level represented in the council, it can also be done. There is free decision. It would be desirable for the composition to reflect the characteristic professional and age distribution, to have the membership consist primarily of the leaders of enterprise youth councils or youth sections and also of representatives of the basic student organizations.

[Question] And in the SZMT?

[Answer] The task of the SZMT youth councils is to coordinate youth problems among the trades and to integrate and referee local youth problems. Therefore, it is important that its members should be experienced in youth work, individuals both representing and skilled with youth. It is true, in the case of youth councils working alongside both the branches and the SZMTs, that they do not manage the work of low-level youth councils and youth sections but rather they support, guide and coordinate it.

[Question] Don't the youth councils and youth sections present competition to the KISZ [Hungarian Community Youth League]?

[Answer] In my opinion no, because I think that the issue is not competition between organizations but rather the more effective solution of the problems of youth and its promotion. The Hungarian Communist Youth League remains the single and unified political mass organization for Hungarian youth also in the future. However, this does not preclude but rather presupposes in a certain sense the coexistence of other youth mechanisms and associations. We do not want to compete with KISZ among youth but we want to work with them on the basis of a sensible distribution of tasks in the interest of youth. With respect to the actual modes of accomplishment, the individual professional trade unions must be assured the fullest possible independence in order to let them apply the solutions most appropriate to the characteristics of the branch. Detailed regulations now would also not be good because, in the case of many problems, it is not expedient to get ahead of practical realities. One must let the problems emerge from life and find the answers to them at the proper time.

[Question] The youth section gathers members of a smaller work place association. What will be the task of the section?

[Answer] The same as that of the youth council, the only difference being that, while the secretary of the youth council is a partner of the executive committee, the head of the section is associated with the chief trade union steward. The head of the section discusses matters involving the youth membership with the steward or chief steward of the trade union. Problems are presented to the enterprise youth council which in turn passes them to the executive committee.

[Question] As to practical implementation, there has not yet evolved a uniform stand with respect to some problems...

[Answer] Indeed not but I do not find this unnatural. Because, as I already mentioned earlier, one need not anticipate everything and particularly we need not overregulate. What do I mean? For instance, that the 30-year age limit need not be rigidly enforced. Or the number of people needed to form a youth section. I think that, with 20 to 25 young people in a basic organization, it would be practical to form the section. There is full agreement that the leaders of the youth councils should be members of the SZTM or of the branch trade union presidia. With respect to their status, we would find it desirable on the long range if youth secretaries who are engaged in an autonomous, independent line of work and have adequate understanding for performing their tasks would become leaders of the youth councils. If, for whatever reason, it cannot be insured now, we can also imagine some other temporary solution which, however, cannot jeopardize the sincerity of the decision and our endeavor to make youth activities meaningful at all levels and to provide the necessary conditions for it.

[Question] Will the situation of youth improve with the planned measures?

[Answer] I venture to reply with an unqualified yes. Not only because we will have more money for housing and child support but because we can get closer to youth and its existing problems which is a significant step toward finding a solution to their problems. Furthermore, I also consider it important that, in the wake of our decision, the possibilities for youth in public life are expected to expand. It is my conviction that, with the establishment of the youth sections and youth councils, not only young people but the entire trade union movement will be enriched. Our work must be expanded and strengthened in a manner worthy of and in tune with the traditions of the trade unions--concluded the secretary of SZOT.

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POLAND

COMMENTARY BLASTS U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNDERGROUND

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Oct 85 p 7

[A PAP commentary]

[Text] When President Ronald Reagan received Milewski from Brussels, who processes himself a representative of the Polish underground, in the White House recently, someone commented in a shocked tone: "That's unbelievable! Since when have principals been receiving their agents? He should get paid, but not received in drawing-rooms..." This concern for good manners concealed the certainty that both Milewski and the people he represented were instruments in alien, non-Polish hands. A paid instrument at that. And if someone still doubted it and believed the hypocritical assurances that the motives of illegal anti-state activity in Poland were noble and purely Polish, he has to abandon all doubts now that the London DZIENNIK POLSKI, an organ of the most reactionary circles amongst Polish emigrants, has published its sensational report. Sounding an alarm in connection with the action taken by an American Senator to cut down on what he considers excessive, multi-million-dollar subsidies to destructive activity abroad (including the activity of the underground in Poland), the paper explicitly stated that this American money, allocated by the Reagan Administration and channelled to the front organization called the National Endowment for Democracy, was eventually transmitted to the underground in Poland. DZIENNIK POLSKI wrote that without this money the underground could not exist at all. So it is dollars, dollars and once more dollars....

So it has been authoritatively confirmed who gives the money and who takes it. And one can easily imagine what for. This money is just another element of the game played by Washington. Everything is organized in a very thought-out manner and all the classic instruments of struggle are used--on the one hand, restrictions against Poland have not yet been lifted; Poles are constantly instructed on how they should solve their own problems, if they want to be praised by the United States; and a powerful propaganda apparatus, including all kinds of Radio Free Europe, has been set in motion; on the other hand, dollars are channelled to the underground to sow unrest in Poland and thus prove to the world that there is opposition to the legal authorities in Poland and there is thus someone to speak for.

That is the reality. That is the truth. Not only political, but also moral truth. No one ever boasts of taking money from others, for this is generally not considered praiseworthy. The fact of being financed reveals the instrumental position of the taker in relation to the giver and therefore also sows doubts as to the purity of intentions and reveals that foreign interests are involved. The report of the emigre paper DZIENNIK POLSKI has exposed a very brutal truth.

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POLAND

FURTHER U.S. 'ANTI-POLISH' SUPPORT NOTED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] Washington (PAP)--As we reported earlier, during a meeting of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, which is on the lookout for ways of reducing the budget deficit, Democratic Senator Ernest Hillings proposed cutting down the National Endowment for Democracy.

The proposal was accepted and the Committee cut down the 18 million dollars proposed by the Administration to 10 million. This is not the final decision, for the Congress may ultimately vote to revert to the 18 million dollars proposed by the Reagan Administration.

The National Endowment for Democracy was established in 1983 on the initiative of President Reagan as a program of assistance to the enemies of the legal authorities in the socialist countries. So the Endowment has been used to finance the activity of the underground in Poland. Some days ago, DZIENNIK POLSKI, a paper of the right-wing Polish emigration in London, expressed regret that these cuts will restrict the flow of dollars to the underground in Poland.

And now the New York paper NOWY DZIENNIK has raised this subject. It has written that the reduction by nearly a half of subsidies channelled through the Endowment will endanger both Solidarity abroad and the underground in Poland. NOWY DZIENNIK has revealed the fact that President Reagan's Endowment has been the main, if not sole, source of aid for the underground.

This is another confirmation of the fact that the subsidies provided by the Reagan Administration are the main force which keeps the underground organizations in Poland alive.

In an interview published in the November issue of READER'S DIGEST, President Reagan announced that the Poles were deprived of, "basic human, religious and economic rights."

This mendacious interview is another instance of open interference in Poland's internal affairs. Asked what advice he would give to the enemies of the socialist authorities in Poland, Reagan replied: "I'd tell them to go on doing

what they've been doing so far." He shamelessly advised the underground to continue activity "to the detriment of the Polish Government."

Replying to another question, Reagan rejected the possibility of restoring normal diplomatic relations with Poland. [the quotes have been retranslated--trans. note].

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POLAND

COMMENTARY ATTACKS REAGAN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 4 Nov 85 p 5

[Text] President Reagan has for a long time now played the role of inspirer, patron and adviser to anti-Communist forces all over the world. A Most-Favored-Nation status of sorts is enjoyed in this respect by the opponents of socialism in Poland, who are supported by particularly warm words and friendly gestures.

Watching these, I often think that if I were among President Reagan's favorites, his attitude would arouse my concern, in addition to wringing tears of joy from my eyes, because the President identifies with the opponents of socialism in Poland in such a demonstrative way, that he more and more openly assumes the role of almost their official spokesman. Former Solidarity leaders in Poland and abroad must feel frustrated eventually for they will be left with none of the many distinctions to which they lay claim, except for doubtful honoris causa titles?

One sign that the wheel of history might be turning this way came in President Reagan's recent 10-minute audience given to the representatives of Solidarity's offices abroad. The head of the White House played the role of a party leader called upon to assess the situation in Poland and to formulate a program for its future, while the role of emigrant activists was limited to listening to the President's monologue and modding--a role in which they showed total and earnest discipline.

Another typical situation arose recently, namely during President Reagan's interview for the READER'S DIGEST, when one of the questions was: "Mr President, if you were to give the Poles some advice, what would you tell Lech Walesa and the Solidarity and Church activists, who oppose the Communist regime?" If, in reply to this question, the White House head had wished to make a good impression, he should have made it clear that it was not up to him to set guidelines for opponents of socialism in Poland, and that he would rather not publicly advise people who have a Nobel Prize brain in their ranks. However, President Reagan decided such nuances were redundant, and simply passed on a message of instructions, a message which started with: "Keep it up, continue doing what you have been doing so far..." [retranslated]

The President's message contained many lofty words about a struggle for freedom and human rights. Only the first sentence, however, is specific: "do what you have been doing so far." This is obviously an instruction to the opponents of socialism to continue activities designed to boycott their own state totally, provoke religious divisions and conflicts, and treat internal unrest as the best path for Poland.

It would be interesting to see what would happen if President Reagan got his roles mixed up, and applied the instructions he gives to opponents of socialism in Poland as a basis for his own domestic policy. One of the first symptoms of such mix-up in his roles would probably be the President's fiery call to all Americans--if not for mass strikes, at least to leave work and manifest their patriotism by going fishing....

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POLAND

'NORMALCY' POSSIBILITY QUESTIONED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 2 Nov 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Franciszek Ociepka]

[Text] One hundred and eighty-five years ago, a pamphlet was published in Paris under a title which came to be a familiar saying for many generations of Poles thereafter, namely "Can Poles Manage to Become an Independent Nation?" (Czy Polacy moga wybic sie na niepodleglosc?). It is time now after centuries of traumatic historical experiences, after a hundred-odd years of enslavement (with the brief interlude of the [1918-1939] Second Republic) and the World War II horror of persecution, after the difficult yet ultimately positive four decades of socialist Poland, after so many sacrifices of blood, and that of our fraternal neighbors, after repeated attempts to rebuild what had been built by all Poles on Polish soil and what united Poles into one nation--after all that, then, it is time now to ask ourselves the fundamental question, can we manage to become a "normal" nation?

I asked myself this question again while reading the recently published volume of General Wojciech Jaruzelski's 1984 speeches. This book prompted me to ask this question not because it concerns--as it is customarily said--"all important matters related to Poland in general and to the party," but because it shows what the supreme representative of the authorities thinks about those matters toward which no one interested in politics can remain indifferent.

The Changing Meaning of What Is 'Abnormal'

But what is normal? I use this term here to denote a historically changing (as distinct from static) harmonious combination of three kinds of "historical facts," those concerning (a) the shape of public life, (b) the aspirations and desires of the majority and (c) the historical geopolitical space in which a marriage of the two former categories can endure. Naturally, this kind of harmony is, as a rule, a relative and imperfect phenomenon, which is affected by many unpredictable historical events great and small, but also one which sets an upper limit on possibilities on the "field of historical potentials," for the nation at any given historical moment.

If you apply these general remarks to Poland's national history you can see in what sense things were "abnormal" in Poland. My contention is that, against the background of this particular interpretation of what is normal in a nation's life, the political history of Poles and Poland, specifically in the last 200-250 years, can be described as "abnormal." This history bears a mark--or at least a majority of Poles believe that it does--of something out of the ordinary, and hence of something temporary and alien, a mark of "foreignness"--not in the sense of being hostile but of "not mine." At present we have the opportunity, especially since 1980, of breaking this peculiar fatalism of Polish history and of ordering and combining the above-listed three great categories of historical factors. I say "an opportunity," not that this "is" already or that we are "vigorously realizing" it. To do this Poles have to do many feasible and almost impossible things. You will read in the book, "I believe in a great socialist Poland. Not in a megalomaniac sense but in a realistic, patriotic sense of this term. This is the kind of Poland we are committed to build."

Before I proceed to a brief description of the 40 years of socialist Poland let me glance back at the past. Why has public life in Poland up to now been more or less "abnormal?" For the sake of simplicity let me highlight this question from just one angle, that of national aspirations. What happened during these past two centuries?

Before Poland lost its national independence [toward the end of the 18th century], it had failed to grant civic rights to the bourgeoisie, who was perfectly ready for that, to say nothing of the peasantry. Poland then was a dictatorship of the interests and aspirations of just one-fifth of society. In the 19th century, the Polish independence movement forfeited the chance to win over the peasants by promising to abolish serfdom. As a result, the peasantry's aspirations, especially those of the rich peasants, were exploited skillfully by the foreign powers holding Poland (remember the 1846 bloody uprising in the Austrian-held Poland, or the 1863 uprising). In the interwar years, following the euphoria of all "classes" over the regained national independence, a series of different conflicts was hushed up--but not resolved--by a government which seized power in the May 1926 coup and which, incidentally, itself soon degenerated into an oligarchy. As a result, more and more groups became estranged from public life resenting both its ideas and its manifestations. and with it, all that happened afterwards. Where does it fit in the spectrum of possibilities ranging from "abnormality" through to an acceptable normality, and from disharmony through to this long-desired harmony? The body of matters implicit in the shorthand term "forty years of socialist Poland" can be considered in two ways. The one cannot be formulated more succinctly than by the author of the book when he says, "The accomplishments of these forty years are, without question, enormous. No other political, social and economic system could have triumphed over that terrible ruin more rapidly or efficiently.... Today we can pride ourselves on the fact that by the effort of the entire nation Poland became an industrialized and urbanized country within the span of just one generation."

This is a fair claim, though it is a generalized statement. It is made not from amidst current problems, but as a statement heard on festive occasions when one looks back at what has been accomplished in the past. Such an approach is of course also necessary for it enables us to give due weight to the entire historical process which rarely involves a string of successes, but usually amounts to coping with difficulties as they emerge.

However, current problems make us look primarily not at the past but at what is happening around and about us right now. Such a perspective often brings to mind other moods, other experiences, other conclusions: those perpetual shortages of staple goods, those never-ending queues, those crowded trams, that bureaucratic arrogance, the fact that we are a nation of great talent but can rarely organize our work, the fact that we have plenty of natural resources and yet go on importing what can be found beneath our own soil, and so on and so forth.

This all too natural approach toward our day-to-day life is encouraged and reinforced by two factors which together make up what are called the "cost of development" and which largely curb the possibility of bringing the above-mentioned three great categories into harmony.

One of them is the temperamental quality which developed in consequence of the vigorous political and cultural changes to which Poles were exposed after 1945. Those changes were so violent that continuity was broken in many areas (e.g., in the economy, in politics, but also in everyday customs), or at the least the individual citizen's position within the social framework changed utterly.

As a result, a large proportion of Polish society went through something like a culture shock for many years. This led us to treat the newly established social institutions of public life as "unrecognizable," as "not mine," as foreign, or at least as much that "do not satisfy me."

Let me add that this widespread dissatisfaction with one's place under the sun and on the social ladder, and, more generally, with the continuing existence of such a ladder at all, a dissatisfaction which was demonstrated by millions of citizens of People's Poland who were once generally reconciled to their fate (not without help from religious institutions)--is construed by me as a significant effect of the pursuit of socialist goals in Poland. To me, this appears to be evidence that at least something has been done to implement the declaration that "Socialism implies a stronger sense of workers' and citizens' dignity, the creation of truly humanistic social relations in the sphere of production and outside it."

The other of the two "cost" factors which introduce, or, more precisely, uphold the disharmony, includes all the mistakes and slips of the "authorities," at both "high" and "low" level. It further includes the recurrent socio-economic, political and moral crises of the 1945-85 period all of which are associated one way or another with the authorities' policies. Add to this the significant geopolitical circumstances following the divisions of the postwar world and you cannot fail to see that the bid to achieve harmony in Poland's public life between national aspirations and historical and geopolitical potentials, is bound to stumble over many daunting obstacles and difficulties.

All of this has produced a paradox in Poland, for citizens, on the one hand, demonstrate their dissatisfaction with things as they are, and, on the other, voice their broad support for the socialist objectives now pursued.

This massive acceptance was already shown in 1956, when society demanded that the ruling party put an end to the gap between its slogans and declarations and its actual policies. The same massive demands to bring declarations and practices into accordance were voiced during all subsequent crises, becoming something like a stock element of government-society relations in Poland. However, the government's commitment to this particular pattern of relations with society has now been reasserted in the 9th PZPR Congress resolution which says, "We pledge our firm commitment to the elimination of existing practices of departure from socialist principles and to the prevention of such departures in the future."

What Now?

The experience of 1980 and the lesson it holds for all Poles, including the authorities (you may read in the book, "We will not allow that which brought such terrible consequences to our nation both before December 13 [1980] and before August 1980 to re-occur"), should become a foundation for building a substantially better and more sophisticated version of the harmony of the above-mentioned "great historical factors." It is imperative for the authorities to shake themselves free of their syndrome of "a besieged fortress" and for society to shed its belief in being a "captive crowd," both of which beliefs have haunted Poland's national history for at least the last two centuries. The authorities must finally understand that Polish society is ripe for democracy. Society in turn must realize "that democracy without obligations, without discipline, without responsibilities, leads straight into anarchy and chaos." At the same time society must also realize that, as it is put succinctly in the book, "democracy will not knock on the door itself."

No authority will give more than it must on its own initiative. This particular proclivity arises from its very nature as a structure committed to ensuring the efficient functioning of the entire body politic. This means that democracy can result only from society's all-out pressure on the authorities, on institutions of public life--that is from society's widest possible participation in the operation of these devices and institutions. Ultimately, this will result in the long-desired "normality" of Poland's national history. This is an opportunity for Poles. We will not forfeit it, even if our trauma seemed to be of cosmic dimensions to us and if our agony seemed to have no match. Whatever we do, we cannot escape the present, obliterate the past, or turn our backs on the future.

Well then, can Poles manage to become a nation like others? It is up to us, or at least primarily so. Only to a small extent will history, or the outside world, be responsible.

In Conclusion

I have no intention of persuading anyone that we are living in the best of all worlds, nor do I wish to justify the status quo. We are facing enormous tasks and an ocean of mistakes--ours, mine, "theirs." However, one thing is certain: we must not begin by changing everything, because in such a case nothing will change, or if it does then only on the surface. Changing everything must end. Some will then say this is already socialism. Others may add that this is a noncentralistic brand of socialism, a "social" kind of socialism, and maybe even a socialism without any adjectives.

Wojciech Jaruzelski, Speeches 1984 [in Polish], Warsaw 1985,
Ksiazka i Wiedza, 29,000 copies printed, 431 pp., price Zl 200.

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POLAND

LITTLE CONFIDENCE, SOME HOPE EXPRESSED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Tadeusz Biedzki]

[Text] A 70-year-old pensioner, asked about his expectations for the future, shrugs dismissively. He sees no future, nor does he wish to mull over it. I get Zl 11,000 a month, and my wife and I have to think hard how to leave something to buy food tomorrow. This is going to go on for a few more years yet, and after that, it will be of no concern to me. I have no future, I have no hope. All I have are my memories, and they help me keep enough courage to live. The good things in my life all happened in the past."

A 20-year-old student of a technical university does not want to talk about the future, either. He has nothing to say about it. He has no clear vision of his future life, nor has he any wish to draw up such a vision for himself. He knows he will lead Poland into the 21st century, but he does not care. "What's the point of thinking about that, when the future seems so bleak that only something really extraordinary, I don't exactly know what, could raise our hopes? Thinking about it is a waste of time, and all these Sisyphean labors only a waste of energy. I have two more years of college, and that's all my future."

A middle-aged worker reacts with laughter to my question. "The future is my daily supper, a film on television, and the job tomorrow. I can manage with that. My wife thinks more about it. Her problem is when, and for what, she can buy the rationed foods, and where she might find a jumper for the kid. That's how people live. Perhaps you think it's all different?"

I picked these people at random. Maybe I just had bad luck?

Are Poles so deeply entangled in their day-to-day lives that they can no longer think about the future? Is the future veiled by so thick a mist that nothing can be seen through it; are there no able, courageous, determined people daring to move forward to build a better future for themselves?

How can this riddle be solved?

Perhaps opinion polls contain some helpful information? In one recent study conducted by the OBOS polling station, only 8.6 percent people described their financial status as good. This means that only this small proportion of Poles can afford not to think frantically about everyday necessities. Only these few

people can afford the luxury of thinking about the future; only they, with their minds free from fears about their present lives, can draw up long-term plans and do something for their future, that is, if they see any motive for them to do this, if the overall atmosphere in society encourages them to think and act with a view to the future.

But does it? Can it ever, if ten times as many respondents reply to the same question that their financial situation is not very good or quite bad, and 5.6 percent say they are very badly off? These people certainly cannot think much about their future or do anything for it. They live only from day to day and nobody can blame them.

So, although I picked my partners at random, what they said was by no means fortuitous. Their attitudes are typical. Disenchantment, a withdrawal into their shells, an overall lack of hope--these are what their statements say.

Let us be clear about one thing: many things in Poland give grounds for such attitudes. Poles live poor lives, especially pensioners, the elderly, the disabled, and the young.

The pensioners are badly off because the system of insurance against old age or disablement was designed with no anticipation of a future crisis, or of the crisis-generated and disastrous inflation. So they live on, as a rule with a spouse to maintain, with their eight, ten or sometimes eleven thousand zloty per month.

Says Wincenty Milek, secretary of the Katowice voivodship branch of the Polish Union of Pensioners and Invalids, "After so many years of work, after raising Poland from its ruins, we are getting simply too little for our labors. Prices went up by 300 or 400 percent, while pensions increased by 30 to 40 percent. Pensioners' incomes, compared with those of other groups, are now lower than ever before.

In a sad letter to the editors of this journal, Mrs. Krystyna Sobela writes, "Since I retired life has been a nightmare. I live alone. I have one room on the second floor. The windows are crumbling, plaster is falling off the ceiling, the tap is outside in the corridor, the coal in the cellar, and I am too weak to fetch it up. I have asthma, and my legs are bad. I am horrified at the thought of the coming winter. My pension is Zl 6,600. Nobody wants to help me. I am looking forward to death."

The young have better health and more strength, but few reasons to be optimistic. This is what a Warsaw scientist in his thirties says about his future, "Eight years ago I married; I have a 5-year-old son and a Ph.D in science. That's quite something, you might say, but what is it in reality? We've no apartment of our own. For eight years now we have been moving from place to place all over Warsaw, renting miserable little rooms for three-quarters of my salary. We stay hardly a year in one before we're told to move out. The kid stays with the grandmother most of the time. We have neither furniture nor household utensils; our clothes are modest. We've been

hearing promises of getting an apartment of our own for ten years now. I will begin normal life only when I'll be almost fifty with a nearly grown-up son. Do you expect me to be optimistic about the future? Frankly, I dread even thinking about the future."

A 28-year-old blacksmith of Chorzow, "I love Poland, but more and more often I'm toying with the idea of going to the West, for good, or at least for several years, to save some money. I admit I have been thinking about that. I'm young, and I want to make something of my life."

Listening to all this, I have my doubts--can this difficult situation of today, the present poor financial status of most Poles, be a source of such frustration, of such hopelessness? Poles went through difficult periods before; frequently they lived modest lives, and yet there was always a great confidence about the future. So, what happened? What are the causes for this widespread apathy?

Sitting around a table during a nameday celebration, like thousands of others in Poland every Saturday, I witness an outburst giving some reasons for this apathy. A young engineer tells the story of his abortive attempts to get his innovative design introduced in his factory. It failed because ambition outran the reality--not real possibilities, but the reality in his factory, where few people cared, the management did not back him, and so, eventually, he too lost all interest in his project. A farmer is embittered because he was not allowed to buy a tractor. His neighbor got a tractor, a second one within five years, but that neighbor is a distant relation of the gmina mayor. A doctor cannot comprehend why he should be earning one-tenth of what his acquaintance, a garage owner, is making. Another person, recently returned from a foreign country, tells the company about the distance which divides us from it, a distance which is widening year in year out.

In this way, all the frustrations are vented over this Saturday Polish table, during a conversation which does not claim to be extremely intellectual.

There is an air of imminent danger around the table. All around it, there is a precipice. The people do not have the strength to rise above this adversity; all they can bring themselves to do is to raise their glasses and listen to the toast which says, "Things always sort themselves out eventually. So, as long as we're still alive, let's drink."

This is Poland.

Assistant Professor Galaszek smiles. He always smiles. His energy and abilities have enabled him to score a string of successes, despite everything and everybody. This explains his good spirits. Even when he gets irritated by someone's stupidity, misanthropy or ineptitude, when he hears in the receiver "Sorry, professor, I can't help you" although he knows perfectly well the other person can help, he puts down the receiver unperturbed and says he will manage. Then he smiles again.

Says Galaszek, "The crisis is just an alibi, a catchword for the stupid and inept. Certainly, life isn't easy, but eventually it's up to you what you do, whether you're at the top or low on the ladder. If all people really desired it, a great deal could be done."

He is not a pontificating know-all. He is a pragmatist whose accomplishments bear out his words. It is enough to take a look at his domain, the Rheumatological Rehabilitation Center in Goczalkowice. This center is one hundred years old, yet right now, as the crisis is ravaging the country, it is going through a proud period of prosperity.

Galaszek and his people, whom he handpicked from amongst candidates who could prove they wanted to do something and who had unconventional ideas, as well as the confidence that they were feasible, are doing everything to uphold this prosperity. The Goczalkowice sanatorium impresses visitors by its vitality, cleanliness and smartness. Modern-looking pavilions are being completed. Their designs have something West-European about them. The therapeutic mud they use there will last for more than a hundred years. The atmosphere is like in your own home. All this is happening at a time when all over Poland the alarm is sounded that Polish sanatoriums are decaying at a frightening rate.

The people in Goczalkowice want to do even more. When Galaszek heard during a Polish-West German rheumatological seminar in Warsaw last year that Professor Fricke cured rheumatic and injury-related diseases with cold-air treatment, he did not wait a day. He talked to Fricke, and later got an invitation to Fricke's clinic in Sendenhorst to look at it for himself. When he came back to Goczalkowice, he began to look for an engineer ("no less crazy than I am") who could build a cryomat, a machine for cold-air treatment at a temperature of 150-160°C below zero. He found his man, engineer Wyrobek, who built a cryomat without a single dollar for imported components. Even more amazing, the whole thing cost just several thousand zloty (yes, this is no printing mistake). So now Goczalkowice is one of the three rehabilitation centers in Europe which use cryotherapy to treat rheumatic diseases.

A tall story? No, this is all true. It is also evidence of the contention that everything is possible provided that people really want to do something. It shows that it is still possible to do something in the Poland of the 1980s. It should make us think again. It should give rise to more optimism, a more confident look into the future. It is a silver lining in murky skies.

I came across Galaszek by accident, but I had hoped to come across such people, and situations, which could boost our spirits, give new hope and a confidence that our future is not a lost cause even before it begins. That proved a truly daunting task. It was difficult, to find real high-achievers, not those heroes of bogus successes who once again begin to be extolled in that all-too-familiar brand of propaganda. However, at long last I came across a few.

I met an honest economist, Dr. Janusz Zadecki, deputy director of the Katowice-based Hydrobudowa-Slask-1 building company. Together with his men he designed a wage system which brought about a revolution at his plant. The company,

which only three years ago was foundering, is now among the best ones in this branch. Employment slid by one-third, while output, productivity and wages doubled.

A miracle? Not at all, just a sensible wage system. It is miraculously simple. Work and wage are subject to a "jogging" type of contract. The management strikes a deal with a group of employees to build a project, undertaking to supply the necessary materials, equipment and transports. The workers provide their time, skills, etc. All the two sides negotiate between themselves is the time of completion and the amount of money the management is willing to pay for the whole job. Suppose the agreed sum is Zl 5 million. The management will pay it out no matter whether the people did their job within the four months as agreed or in six or three months. The workers, then, have an interest in finishing their job as quickly as possible. This shared interest is producing admirable effects.

I also learnt about Lucjan Gasior's invention. It can be applied to concrete, ceramic products and cement mortar. Gasior, making these things, used water submitted to the action of a magnet. As a result, his concrete hardens 25 percent more quickly than traditional concrete, its resistance to stress is 31 percent, to bending 37.2 percent and average life 40 percent higher than that of concrete made in the ordinary way.

These data were supplied by the Mining and Metallurgy Academy of Cracow and by the Gliwice-based Engineering Works company. As for potential benefits, we can at this point rely only on theoretical calculations, which point to substantial savings in cement and steel and to less bulky and less heavy elements. A new opportunity is presenting itself in the construction sector, especially since Gasior's magnetic device is an ordinary ring fixed on a pipe and is entirely maintenance-free. Gasior's patented invention is waiting for application.

Galaszek, Zadecki, Gasior--how many such people lived in Poland? They are all little sparks of hope amidst the darkness of hopelessness. They defy the present plight; they are interested in a brighter future. They work for themselves and for others. They push Poland forward.

This, too, is Poland.

What will Poland be in the future--in five, ten, twenty years from now. It is extremely difficult to answer this question, both to the doubtful, the frustrated and the apathetic, and to those who are determined to do something. It takes a great deal of courage to be a prophet in your own country.

Children have a lot of courage, fantasy and hope. Thirteen-year-old Mariusz Michalski of Poznan wrote in his composition on Poland in the year 2000, "It will be a beautiful country of beautiful, wise, hard-working people. People will be good, honest and fair to each other. The problems and hardships of today will disappear. Each family will live in its own home, and some, those working best, will build their own family houses. Shops will be

chock-full of goods, and queues will disappear. Trains, buses and streetcars will not be crowded, and there will always be free seats. Water and air will be clean again. People will learn to be obedient, the authorities will learn to govern well. Concord will rule, and nobody will have to emigrate."

A naive, unrealistic childish vision. But, is it really so naive, so unrealistic? Don't we, the adults, want such a Poland? Isn't that our own dream? Why should we part with such dreams right from the start? Why should we discard them as unrealistic without looking at them first?

The 13-year-old's vision should in fact be taken as our vision of the future. Is this ridiculous? Then show me another vision which mirrors our aspirations and hopes in a better way.

Poland undoubtedly needs a wise and ambitious program. The current official call to lift ourselves out of the crisis will release no strength or energy in the nation. It is a defensive slogan, with little attraction. What we need is an attractive slogan which will conjure up a vision of a better future, which will mobilize Poles to greater effort and make them confident again.

How can such a dream be realized? This is obviously a task for today.

Perhaps the current crisis is a chance for Poland? The crisis makes it more imperative than ever to look for unconventional and innovative solutions. They might help Poland off the bottom. Such things happened before in other countries. Why shouldn't this be so in Poland, and now?

I talked about this with representatives of different trades and politicians. My talks left me worried. Those who have such a great say on various things, who are at the helm, want no great programs, no large strides, no untested models. They prefer to tread familiar paths. "Slowly but surely," they say.

They say they are realists. They fail to notice that this kind of realism bears poor fruit. True, the specter of starvation has disappeared, but then, no great vision has appeared which would be commensurate with Poland's ambitions and potentials for the 21st century. This is why those talks, those detached and allegedly balanced opinions, worry me.

Sitting back in my comfortable armchair, I try to imagine what is in store for Poland tomorrow. I remember the people I mentioned above, both the apathetic and frustrated and those full of verve and optimism. I am not sure. Now it seems the ones are right, now the others.

Man cannot live without hope. This is a profound truth. But does this hope, the hope of an average Pole of 1985, have real foundations?

I cannot answer this.

I would like to be able again to sit back in my armchair several years from now and to read once more Mariusz Michalski's composition of 1985 in which he painted such a beautiful picture of Poland's future. I would like to be able to say that the boy's vision has almost become true. Then I could repeat, with deep satisfaction, after Stanislaw Wyspianski, "this is Poland."

POLAND

POLLING AGENCY ON PRE-ELECTION SURVEYS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 October 85 p 1

[Text] A PAP reporter has talked to Albin Kania, who heads the Polish Radio and Television's polling agency OBOP, about polls conducted just before the October 13 general election.

Question: Before last year's local elections, OBOP conducted a series of polls. Did your agency do the same before the general election?

Answer: We did. We conducted ten different polls before the election, five of them before the holiday period, once a month from February through to early July, followed by five after the holiday period at weekly intervals. They included polls concerned only with electoral matters and more comprehensive questions about other topics. As a rule, we do not conduct polls in July or August because many people are away on vacation our employees might fail to find too many doors closed.

Question: What did your employees ask people about?

Answer: Above all, people were asked about their intentions to go or not to go to the polls. But they also asked if people were interested in the election, if they were familiar with the electoral law, what they thought about radio and television programs concerning the election, whether or not they knew candidates from their constituencies, and what hopes they had in connection with the election and with the Sejm to be elected.

Question: What did you find out about people's plans to go to the polls in your polls conducted before the vacations?

Answer: In the first half of the year some 60 percent of all respondents said they planned to vote, some 30 percent hadn't made up their minds, and some 10 percent said they would not vote. In March, for example, 63 percent said "Yes" to the question about going to the polls, 28 percent said "I don't know yet," and 9 percent said "No." In a poll conducted on July 2-3, some 61 percent said "Yes," 24 percent said "I don't know yet," and 15 percent said "No." You will recall that the first half saw the three-stage retail price increase operation. Moreover, the election then seemed a remote prospect and something people knew little about. The March poll, for instance, revealed

that 28 percent of all respondents didn't even know an election was scheduled to be held in Poland this year. The early-July poll showed that only 36 percent of all respondents knew the exact date of the scheduled election.

Question: In the post-vacation polls, did your agency correctly predict the turnout, the way you did before the 1984 local elections?

Answer: Changes were disclosed in the first poll conducted after the vacations. Early in September 72 percent of all respondents said they would vote, 18 percent said they "didn't know yet," and 10 percent said "No." In subsequent September polls 71 percent and 75 percent, respectively, said they would go to the polls. In October, 76-79 percent of the respondents said they would, 12-13 percent said they didn't know, and 8-11 percent said they would not vote.

Question: What do you think caused this sharp rise in the proportion of people determined to vote after the vacations? Did you try to probe this?

Answer: Our polls indicate that as the price increase operation was gradually forgotten and the election campaign gained momentum, the public mood was improved, hopes for a brighter future began to spread, as did trust in the authorities and in the media. In March, for instance, 39 percent of all respondents said they hoped the situation in Poland would improve after the general election, whereas in September 51 percent did. Trust in the Sejm was declared by 64 percent in March, and by 73 percent in October. Early this year, 56 percent of all respondents said they trusted the government, against 70 percent in recent weeks. We also asked respondents if they thought General Jaruzelski was a good prime minister. In January this year, 77 percent said they thought so, while in a poll conducted on October 14 and 15, that is immediately after the election, 85 percent said so. Early in the year some 50 percent of all respondents said they trusted the information concerning Poland and Polish affairs as presented on television, but in recent weeks this proportion rose to 63 percent.

The course of the election campaign, too, was generally received favorably by the polled people. People noticed that many matters of great importance for everyday life were raised during electoral meetings and that candidates took a close interest in such matters. That particular climate boosted expectations attached to the future Sejm and encouraged people to go to the polls.

Question: Who are those who didn't vote? Did your polls disclose anything specific on this?

Answer: Our findings point at several different reasons for staying away from the polls. From February through to October, there was one group of people who firmly said they wouldn't vote. Shortly before election day, they accounted for some 8 percent of all. This group is composed of people who are staunchly opposed to the reality around them and to the authorities. These people were probably determined all along not to go to the polls.

But there were also those who replied "I don't know yet" when asked if they would vote. Successive polls revealed this group of people to be shrinking-- from 28 percent of all respondents in February to 24 percent early in July to 18 percent in September and to 13 percent in October. So, more than one half of these people who weren't sure at first eventually did go to the polls. The others, for different reasons, didn't show up at the booths. This latter group of undecided people who eventually didn't vote includes people who had no interest at all in public affairs, those who resent various bad things in Poland, those who made their voting dependent on the solution of various group or private claims, and those who were prevented by disease or sudden travel.

Naturally, all I said is based on preliminary findings. A more accurate reply to your latest question can be supplied when our agency has completed detailed analyses of all findings.

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OLSZOWSKI MEETS EXPATRIATE POLES

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] On October 23, Politburo member and Foreign Affairs Minister Stefan Olszowski met representatives of expatriate Poles who came to Warsaw for the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the "Polonia" Association for Contacts With Expatriate Poles.

The guests warmly assured Olszowski that expatriate Poles have been and will remain faithful to Poland's traditions, culture and language, and will pass their attachment to the country of their forefathers on to subsequent generations, in particular to the young.

Minister Olszowski cordially thanked expatriate Poles for all their efforts to strengthen their links with Poland.

"I wish to assure you," he said, "that the Polish Government will continue to support a growth of comprehensive contacts with the millions of expatriate Poles who are living abroad. Those seeking contact with Polish national culture can always rely on the assistance of Polish cultural, scientific and educational institutions. We shall also support cooperation with expatriate Poles in the sectors of economy, trade and tourism.

"We would particularly wish expatriate Poles to be spokesmen for the stability and inviolability of Poland's postwar borders and also hope that, whenever possible without infringing their civic loyalty to their states of residence, they will provide us with advice and assistance to modernize the Polish economy, to speed up Poland's participation in the scientific and technological revolution and the race towards full modernization in which Poland is taking part on the threshold of the 21st century.

"There is only one Polish nation. We share the same traditions, culture, history and patriotic pride at being Polish. We also share the desire to see Poland enjoy due respect among the nations of the world."

On behalf of Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Government, Olszowski extended greetings to his guests and wished them satisfaction from their work for the good of Poland.

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POLAND

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE, HIGHER EDUCATION SESSION

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 Oct 85 p 6

[Text] The National Council for Science and Higher Education (RGNiSW) is holding a working session (scheduled for October 23-25) in Warsaw. This is the last but one RGNiSW session before the final one scheduled for November, during which this non-government body will sum up its work, accomplishments, experience and failures.

The present session was convened to discuss the upcoming 3d Congress of Polish Science, to work out the council's position on implementing regulations to the amendment to the law on higher education, and to discuss once again some problems which arose during consultations on the proposed amendment before it was approved by the Sejm.

Referring to this latter topic, the RGNiSW recapitulated all it had said on the amendment and what it failed to push through. It also discussed some very critical remarks, made on the Sejm forum, and in which speakers challenged the council's own work and its claim to represent the entire academic community of Poland.

"I can't say if the council did all it could, but I can say that our actions were honest, responsible, straightforward and free of hypocrisy, and that they were fully in line with the RGNiSW statutes and hence perfectly legitimate. We have come forward with many suggestions which will be used in the work of Poland's higher schools and will influence people's minds."

I think these words are the best succinct form of conclusions from the council's last discussion of legislation concerning higher education.

The coming Congress of Polish Science was a next important topic of debates. The council started a discussion of the theses for the congress in the academic community several months ago. It also made clear to the organizing committee its own position on it, in which it discussed many important matters concerning Polish science and higher education (organization, personnel policies, educational problems and teaching curricula, financing and planning research projects, equipment of research institutions with laboratory equipment, scientific

information and publications, cooperation with foreign research institutions, and the [word indistinct] of researchers). The congress organizers have assessed this paper very favorably as "an important document concerning the future of science and higher education."

The council noted with satisfaction the organizing committee's decision to appoint--at the initiative of professors Bogdan Suchodolski, Jan Szczepanski and Aleksander Gieysztor--a special commission which is to prepare materials on "Science, Society and Human Problems." This move will legitimate the role of social science, which has up to now been largely ignored in preparations for the congress. The council said that it hoped the materials to be submitted by the commission will include conclusions from the very interesting conference on the ethos of researchers which was cosponsored by the RGNiSW, because the very important matter of moral standards of academics and researchers of all kinds has recently often been disregarded by the academic community.

The amendment to the law on higher education obligates the council to present its opinion on new implementing regulations. Three such regulations have been discussed during the current session, namely the Science and Higher Education Minister's regulations concerning rules for students, procedures and rules of evaluating the work of teaching staffs at colleges, and rules for post-graduate studies. The former two acts proved to be very controversial. As for rules for students (a matter the council raised in a special memorandum to the minister), the RGNiSW chiefly questions the proposed tougher consequences for students failing to submit M.A. theses on schedule. The minister wants this to entail an automatic expulsion of the student concerned, who could be enrolled again only after one year's work (ending with a positive report from the employer) or after obligatory military service. The council recognized that although completion of college studies on time is indeed a serious problem, it cannot possibly be resolved by rigorous administrative moves. What should be eliminated are causes, not consequences. If the proposed sanctions are indeed enacted, the first effect will be M.A. theses of poor scholarly quality. Experience shows that it is often the best students who fail to submit their theses on schedule because they work most honestly, and hence longer, on their papers than others.

The regulation concerning the evaluation of teaching staffs (which is subject to consultation with the council) has been sent back to the minister with many suggested modifications.

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SEJM POPULATION BREAKDOWN BY AGE, PARTY, PROFESSION

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 26 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Zygmunt Szeliga]

[Text] Several days from now the 460 deputies to the new Sejm will convene at Wiejska Street for their first sitting. For the next 4 years they will act as the nation's supreme authority, deciding the most important affairs of the state and of society. They take over the heritage of the 8th Sejm, which was elected as a "Sejm of applauding yesmen," but which will pass into the history books as a Sejm of reform and renewal regaining the status it deserves to hold in the nation's life.

This is no easy heritage, especially since, in a sense, the new Sejm will be in a more difficult position than the previous one. To use economic jargon, the 8th Sejm will be working the few "reserves" to rely upon. The 8th Sejm won recognition and applause (which it indeed deserved) for eliminating various kinds of nonsense from the Polish economy, from the body of laws, and from public life in general, and for bringing natural rules and principles back to life. The 9th Sejm, however, will have hardly any such "reserves" to take advantage of. So, the things it will do will not be nearly as spectacular as under the 8th Sejm, and, on the other hand, it will have to make very difficult decisions to decide the nation's future, which appears as anything but rosy.

Just what will this new Sejm do? Will it be able to stand up to its formidable task and to society's expectations? Only the future will tell. At this point, as the new Sejm is about to start its work, all we can do is to use the knowledge we have about the people in it to work out some idea about its future style of work. Owing to the new electoral law, the 460 new deputies were elected by a more democratic procedure than in any of the previous eight elections. They were elected from among a larger number of candidates than ever before.

What, then, is the Sejm we elected? Before I present the deputies, let me cite a few electoral figures

which this time are more interesting than on previous occasions. The high turnout, of course, is important proof of the new Sejm's legitimacy. However I confess that, apart from a high turnout, I anticipated a less crushing

victory of candidates listed first in order of preference, and I believed some candidates listed second might win. This didn't happen, which should make us think, especially since never during the entire election campaign did anyone call on voters to drop their ballots without cancelling names, which was one of the differences between this election and previous ones. Nor can this abdication by voters of one of their elementary rights be explained by fears of any sanctions or harassment if they went behind the curtain. No such things happen in Poland now, and even on previous occasions I can't recall anyone being punished for striking off any candidates on ballots.

The electoral law does not stipulate a separate count of ballots with no cancellations, nor does the State Electoral Commission have to publish such statistics, but if you make the effort to look closely at the numbers of votes given to individual candidates, you can draw at least some conclusions. For instance, you may find that of the 173,723 people who took part in the election in the Cracow-Nowa Huta constituency, at least 30,661 people, or 17 percent availed themselves of their right to strike off some names, and in the Warsaw-Ochota constituency at least 20,118 people, or 16 percent, out of a total of 194,581 did that. These cases represent one side of the spectrum. At the other extreme you will find the Chelm voivodship where no less than 3,485 but no more than 9,510 people out of a total of 137,071 went behind the curtain, which is no more than 7 percent.

The "at least" count is fully reliable; it is based on the difference between the total number of votes in a constituency and that of votes given to the least successful candidate. This implies that at least so many voters struck off some names on their ballots. On this basis it can be taken for granted that at least 1,042,271 voters all over Poland availed themselves of the right to strike off names. This may at first glance seem an impressive figure, but in fact it amounts to no more than just 5 percent of all voters.

Unfortunately, it is at the same time impossible to estimate accurately the other extreme, that is, exactly how many people at most used their pencils. Assuming that each voter struck off only one name, the number of ballots with cancellings amounts to a little over 5 million, or 25 percent of all ballots cast, but this is certainly a far-fetched assumption. It should be assumed that the vast majority of voters going behind the curtain struck off not one but more candidates named in first place, and this reduces the total number of these voters very considerably.

The number of voters striking off names on ballots is probably somewhere between the lower limit of 5 percent and the 10-15 percent marking the upper limit. I regard this as a disappointing result which the new Sejm also should consider a significant indicator. While this figure may imply a widespread acceptance of preliminary selections done by political and public organizations and by selection councils and electoral commissions, it may also be construed as evidence of little genuine interest on the part of voters who perhaps think it is ultimately of no importance which of the two candidates is elected. But this is the very thing which should certainly be of importance!

Of the 410 candidates in first places on constituency lists, 25 got more than 98 percent (though nobody got more than 99 percent) of all votes. Only six candidates won less than 90 percent. Stanislaw Mazur, chairman of the ZSL Cracow voivodship committee, who ran in Cracow-Nowa Huta, received the smallest number of votes (82.81 percent). He was followed by Ryszard Lukasiewicz, chief editor of EXPRESS WIECZORNY, in the Warsaw-Ochota constituency (87.48 percent), Stanislaw Kania, Council of State member and formerly First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, in Gdansk (88.00 percent), and by Professor Sylwester Zawadzki (88.56 percent), Ryszard Wojna (89.39 percent) and Szymon Szurmiej (89.64 percent)--the last three all in the Warsaw-Srodmiescie constituency.

As for candidates on the national list, I had predicted before election day that Ryszard Szurkowski, Wojciech Siemion, Krystyna Zielinska and Malgorzata Niepokulczycka would win the largest numbers of votes. Szurkowski alone proved me right. The two ladies are quite high on the ladder, but still below some other candidates, whereas Siemion came low on the list of successful candidates. I had also predicted that differences in numbers of votes for individual candidates on the national list would be greater than they actually were. Even the most "debatable" candidates were struck off by less than 4 percent of all voters.

The present one is truly

an entirely new Sejm.

Of the 460 deputies elected on October 13, only 87, or less than 20 percent, will "return" to Wiejska Street after their previous term. As many as 373 deputies are entirely new there, debutantes in parliament.

I am not sure, but I believe this has no precedent in the 40 years of socialist Poland and perhaps even in the world. In the previous general election of March 1980, more than a half of the successful candidates (237, to be exact) had sat on the 7th Sejm, against 223 "new" people. As a rule, first Sejm sittings bring together old acquaintances who worked together for at least 4 years before that, or sometimes even longer.

It will be entirely different this time. Only a few will find "their" seats in benches, a majority of them will be looking around to find their seats. Needless to say, "deputies' benches" is used here both in the literal and the metaphorical meanings--for what is meant is any given deputy's situation in the structure of parliamentary work.

Moreover, if you consider that many of those "old" deputies are top state and party officials who are engrossed in their "normal" work rather than in parliamentary activities, you will realize that perhaps no more than 50-60 deputies, or at most a dozen or so percent, can be regarded as continuing the previous parliament. This is by no means a trifling circumstance. On the one hand, this radical rejuvenation of the Sejm fulfills one of the demands voiced in the post-August renewal process. On the other hand, it may be feared

that the new Sejm, with deputies only learning the art of parliamentary work, may not be as active or efficient as it should be, especially in the first phase. I think this will generate new needs, in particular one for better legal advice and organizational assistance for the new deputies.

This fact is important also because

this Sejm is younger

than and differs from the previous one in many respects, including a lack of political experience.

Let us first look at the age structure of deputies to the previous Sejm (I mean the Sejm elected in 1980, which, as will be recalled, changed considerably in the course of its tenure; but what should interest us here is the "starting point" of the two parliaments) and to the present one:

<u>Age class</u>	<u>Number of deputies</u>	
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
Under 25	2	2
25-29	10	15
30-39	65	85
40-49	148	151
50-59	180	141
60-69	43	54
70 and over	12	12

More than half of all deputies to the 8th Sejm (235) were 50 years of age or over. In the present Sejm, more than a half of all (253) are under 50, with the number of people in their thirties having increased more than others.

The youngest deputies are two 23-year-old women--Danuta Pawlikowska of Jelenia and Mirosława Scianska of Dabrowa Gornicza.

In 1980, the oldest deputy was 79-year-old Jerzy Zietek of Katowice. The group of nestors in the present Sejm is older, including Bogdan Suchodolski (82), Halina Auderska (81), Henryk Jablonski (76), Jan Dobraczynski and Kazimierz Secomski (each 75), Stanislaw Opalko (74), Edmund Meclewski and Grzegorz L. Seidler (each 72), Roman Paszkowski (71), Zygmunt Kostarczyk, Jan Karol Kostrzewski and Wiktor Pawlak (each 70). Three of these people (Auderska, Jablonski, and Secomski) also sat on the 8th Sejm.

As regards education, I found that at least 270 deputies have college-level education. Science is represented by more deputies than in the previous Sejm; I counted 43 professional researchers among the new deputies, 40 of them professors. This group includes many deputies to the 8th Sejm (among them Henryk Jablonski, Zbigniew Gertych, Jerzy Ozdowski, Sylwester Zawadzki, Jarema Maciszewski, Edward Kowalczyk, Kazimierz Secomski, Krystyna Jandy-Jendroska).

But there are fewer women in the present Sejm, namely 93, or 13 less than in the 8th Sejm.

Party proportions

have changed considerably. I don't mean just the respective proportions of the three parties and other organized groups but, even more, the personal composition inside each of them, especially inside the PZPR caucus.

This caucus is smaller now. Instead of the 261 deputies in several of the previous Sejms, the PZPR now has 245 deputies. But this body differs considerably from previous PZPR caucuses. Only 48 PZPR deputies now in the Sejm also sat on the previous one. However, this is not the most important difference.

There were as many as 99 PZPR Central Committee members and alternate members in the 8th Sejm, while in the present one there are only 28, or little more than 10 percent of all deputies. This is, on all counts, a very radical change which is indicative of the overall tendency to drop the previous practice of one person holding top posts in the party and in the state administration.

This tendency is even more visible when you consider the representation of the top party leadership and of professional party functionaries in the Sejm. The previous Sejm included as deputies all Politburo members and alternate members, CC Secretaries and CC Secretariat members. Of the 23 members of the party's top leadership, only 11 sit on the present Sejm (Wojciech Jaruzelski, Kazimierz Barcikowski, Tadeusz Czechowicz, Jozef Czyrek, Zbigniew Messner, Stanislaw Opalko, Tadeus Porebski, Marian Wozniak, Stanislaw Bejger, Czeslaw Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki).

The previous Sejm furthermore included all first secretaries of voivodship committees. In the 9th Sejm, the proportion in this case is similar to that of the top leadership, because of the 49 first secretaries only 25 were elected Sejm deputies. Also, some CC department heads and lower-ranking functionaries and full-time employees of the party apparat were deputies to the 8th Sejm. Now the central party apparat is represented at the Sejm only by one deputy-- Edward Szymanski, who heads the Central Committee's Office for Sejm Affairs (naturally, I disregard here the First Secretary and CC Secretaries).

In all, the previous Sejm (as in April 1980) included more than 70 full-time party functionaries and employees, accounting for more than 15 percent of the entire Sejm. Now the Sejm includes only 33 percent, or little more than 7 percent of all deputies.

Looking at this matter from another angle, it can be said that the previous PZPR caucus was largely dominated by the party apparat and by top party officials, whereas the present one will be clearly dominated by nonprofessional party activists.

My estimates further indicate that in the ZSL and SD caucuses, too, officials from central and voivodship party bodies have given way to a greater number of nonprofessional activists.

The youth movement is also represented in greater numbers now than in the 8th Sejm. As many as 49 deputies declare membership in one of the youth organizations, 36 of them in the Socialist Union of Polish Youth ZSMP. The scouts, apart from their chief Ryszard Wosinski, are represented by Jacek Piechota, who heads the Polish Scouting Union (ZHP) branch in Szczecin and who is one of the youngest deputies (26). Ryszard Szurkowski and Andrzej Wyglenda, the latter a top speedway racer now turned coach, create a chance for sport to be more often one of the Sejm's concerns than before.

Looking at the occupational structure of the new Sejm, I think that there are perhaps

too few lawyers

among deputies, for I have counted only 21. Since legislation is the Sejm's top job, this modest representation may be insufficient, and may create various difficulties. Economists have many more representatives among deputies, which in turn augurs well for the economic reform and for economic affairs at large in the new Sejm.

The community of economists is indeed strongly represented, especially in the context of the reform. There are quite a few enterprise directors among deputies (Tadeusz Ryczaj from WSK- Mielec, Barbara Polanska from Pollena-Uroda, Wojciech Budzynski from the Chelm cement works, Alojzy Nowicki from the Gdansk sugar refinery, Ryszard Celinski from the Hortex company of Ryki, and others). Yet a larger group of deputies includes "intermediate-level" managers--department heads, chief engineers, foremen, etc.; I counted 65 people in this group even disregarding economists among them. Perhaps the new Sejm may even be called one of economists and technicians, especially since in addition to these people there is also a sizeable group of workers engaged directly in production.

I counted 53 private farmers among the deputies, but probably there are more. There are also some twenty employees of state and cooperative farms in the new Sejm.

Moreover, there are, among the deputies, at least eight private tradesmen who run their own shops. This, too, is evidence of positive changes reflecting the economy's general line of change and the growing importance of this economic sector.

Teachers are represented by more people than before, whereas the health service sector, although it now has more deputies than in the 8th Sejm, has a more modest representation than teachers. The Sejm includes ten army generals, one more than in 1980, but these again are largely new people, for the "old" ones include only Wojciech Jaruzelski, Florian Siwicki, and Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, whereas the "new" ones are Czeslaw Kiszcak, Jerzy Skalski, Jozef Baryla, Roman Paszkowski, Edward Lukasik, Longin Lozowicki, and Krzysztof Jasinski.

In 1980, 12 cabinet members of the outgoing government won seats, namely Premier Edward Babiuch, Deputy Premiers Kazimierz Barcikowski, Longin Cegielski, Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Tadeusz Pyka, Kazimierz Secomski, Tadesz Wrzaszczyk, and Ministers Wojciech Jaruzelski, Jan Kaminski, Stanislaw Kowalczyk, Emil Kolodziej and Emil Wojtaszek. The current government's representation at the Sejm includes almost as many people, namely Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski, Deputy Premiers Manfred Gorywoda, Zenon Komender, Edward Kowalczyk, Roman Malinowski, Zbigniew Messner, Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, and Ministers Czeslaw Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki and Tadeusz Szelachowski--ten people in all. Only one name appears on both lists--the current Prime Minister's. But it should be pointed out that several members of the pre-1980 cabinet also won seats in the new Sejm, though in different character (Barcikowski, Kolodziej, Secomski), and that most of the government members now elected were also deputies to the 8th Sejm.

Representation of the arts and culture

has remained basically unchanged, although personal changes are also visible. Of the six writers with seats in the 8th Sejm, three were re-elected (Halina Auderska, Jozef Ozga-Michalski, Wojciech Zukrowski). The "new" people include Jan Dobraczynski, Tadeusz Kijonka and Albin Siekierski. The visual and performing arts were represented by actor Gustaw Holoubek, sculptor Marian Konieczny, and painter Romuald Bukowski in the 1980 Sejm. Of these, only Konieczny won a seat in the 9th Sejm. However, altogether artists have now more representatives--three actors (Wojciech Siemion, Szymon Szurmiej, Jerzy Trela), musician Robert Satanowski, and film director Jerzy Kawalerowicz.

Finally, let me mention the representation of my own community, the journalists. In 1980, altogether 19 deputies declared journalism as their profession. Of those, Jozef Barecki, Witold Lipski, Edmund Meclewski, Kazimierz Morawski, Piotr Stefanski, Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski and Ryszard Wojna succeeded in winning seats in the 9th Sejm. Curiously, while the Sejm as a whole was replaced in 80 percent of seats, in the group of journalists 35 percent managed to keep their seats.... But altogether there are more journalists in the 9th Sejm than before, for apart from the above-named seven people another 15 declare themselves to be journalists including some who are no longer active in this profession.

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POLAND

NEW SEJM COMPOSITION

Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 27 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Jan Ruranski]

[Text] Now that emotions aroused by the general election have subsided let us take a look at those whom we elected. Whilst what follows is anything but an accurate analysis, I hope it will give readers some idea of the new Sejm's composition.

To what extent is it true this is indeed a new Sejm? Even a cursory look shows it is indeed largely a new body, maybe even too much so, because only 87 of the 460 deputies sat in a previous Sejm. So, four out of five deputies hold this function for the first time in their lives.

Proportions between the parties are the same as before:

- the PZPR caucus includes 245 deputies (53.3 percent)
- the ZSL caucus includes 106 deputies (some 23 percent)
- the SD caucus includes 35 deputies (8 percent)
- nonaffiliated deputies--75 people--account for some 16 percent of all.

Let us now look at the occupational structure of the new Sejm. Let me first point out that the data I have are only general because professional careers and backgrounds of the deputies cannot be accurately described in a brief analysis. The new Sejm, for example, includes only 10 lawyers, that is, people professionally active as lawyers, although several others hold degrees in law. The data quoted below are therefore designed only to give a general idea.

White-collar employees constitute the largest group, namely 280 people. Next come workers (106), farmers (50), and private craftsmen (10).

As for occupational groups, engineers and technicians come first (103 people).

Managerial personnel, in the broad sense, make up 70 deputies, including the Prime Minister, the Council of State Chairman, three Deputy Premiers, four Government Ministers, 25 Secretaries of PZPR voivodship committees, and 11 generals.

Academics include 50 deputies.
Teachers 24 deputies.
Journalists 19 deputies.
Economists 19 deputies.
Employees of cultural institutions 18 deputies.
The health service is represented by 15 deputies.
Lawyers 10 deputies.
Pensioners nine deputies.

The new Sejm has a relatively high level of education. Sixty percent of all deputies have college level education, and only 5 percent have elementary education.

A vast majority of deputies are more than 35 years old. Some 335 deputies are between 36 and 60 years of age. Professor Bogdan Suchodolski is the eldest of all (82). The youngest voivodship, Danuta Pawlikowska, is 23. Since we are mentioning women, the new Sejm includes 93 female deputies.

As for public organizations represented at the Sejm, the largest representation is that of youth organizations (50): the Union of Polish Socialist Youth ZSMP (36), the Union of Rural Youth ZMW (9), and the Polish Scouting Union ZHP (4). Thirty deputies are trade union officials, and 40 are PRON activists.

This is roughly the picture today. Some of these figures may change during the term, as deputies may change their occupations, be promoted, etc. The biggest difference compared to the 8th Sejm is the radical renewal of the composition of the Sejm as mentioned at the outset. Some occupational groups have increased their representations substantially, say, the teachers, who had 13 deputies in the previous Sejm and now have 24. Researchers had 29 deputies in the 8th Sejm while now they have 50. However, people holding jobs in the party apparat or in the administration constitute a smaller group in the 9th Sejm.

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PZPR AUDIT PRESIDIUM IN SESSION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 31 Oct-3 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] At its session yesterday, the Central Control Commission [CKKP] of the PZPR discussed what party control commissions had done to implement the "Guidelines for the Party's Personnel Policy."

The presidium condoned the practice of party bodies to recommend individuals to local control commissions for posts even before candidacies are considered. The control commissions can in such cases use all the information they have on the ground of their disciplinary, auditing and preventive actions. The presidium urged groups appointed to carry out regular personnel reviews to include representatives of party control commissions.

Control Commissions' appeals to party bodies to withdraw party recommendations for people holding managerial posts were approved. Most of the 279 such appeals which the control commissions advanced in the first eight months of this year have already been considered. Most often they apply to people who were proven guilty of irregularities in their work, of mismanagement, or of violating moral standards. They watch that party members observe the moral standards as set out in the PZPR statutes continues to be a top responsibility of party control commissions, the presidium said.

The presidium underlined the positive effects of admonitory talks which party control commissions have held with party members guilty of various irregularities. Some 4,000 such talks were held in the first half of this year, involving more than 2,000 people holding managerial posts.

the presidium then heard a report on actions the CKKP took together with the Central Committee departments for Agriculture and for Economics to discipline party members implicated in irregularities which occurred during this year's harvest. In particular, this involved cases, disclosed by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK), of shortage of some spare parts, of repairs done behind schedules, and of failures to prepare farming machinery in time for the harvest.

To establish the causes, the CKKP had talks with top officials from the ministries of Metallurgy and Engineering, Finance, Agriculture and Food, Chemicals and Light Industries, Foreign Trade, with the Union of Farmers Circles

and Organizations and with the Agroma Farming Machinery Suppliers. The CKKP also heard explanations from the directors and party secretaries of the Plock Farming Machinery Factory and from the Ursus tractor factory.

The presidium endorsed the conclusions drawn from these talks which indicate that, apart from objective difficulties, also a lack of initiative, inefficiency and ill discipline on the part of the people responsible had caused many of the bottlenecks which arose during this year's harvest. These people are responsible before the party for a consistent implementation of decisions made by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress and the 11th CC Plenum. The presidium called for a speeding up of work designed to resolve the problem of spare parts and their distribution, and that of machinery repair quality and schedules.

The presidium also heard a report on the work of CKKP disciplinary groups in the first three quarters of this year. These groups met for 41 sessions to consider 274 cases, as a result of which they expelled 76 people from the PZPR and dispensed 72 less severe party punishments. They also considered 126 appeals against expulsions and applications for striking previous party punishments off the records or for readmitting some people to the PZPR.

The CKKP session was chaired by Jan Urbanski.

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JARUZELSKI RECEIVES HUNGARIAN BERECH

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] PZPR First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski has received Janos Berecz, Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party CC, who is visiting Poland at the invitation of the PZPR CC.

Jaruzelski outlined the sociopolitical situation in Poland and presented the party's activities before the 10th PZPR Congress.

Janos Berecz reported on his party's work after the 13th Congress, in particular in the sphere of ideology and propaganda.

Jaruzelski and Berecz emphasized the favorable growth of cooperation between the PZPR and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, and also between the ideological sectors of both countries.

Politburo member and PZPR CC Secretary, Jan Glowczyk, and Hungary's Ambassador to Poland, Gyorgy Biczó, were present at the meeting.

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OCTOBER REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] On November 7, the Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Aleksandr Aksyonov, gave a reception in connection with the 68th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The reception was attended by PZPR First Secretary, Chairman of the Council of State, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Politburo member, Premier Zbigniew Messner, Sejm Speaker, ZSL Chairman Roman Malinowski, Deputy Chairman of the Council of State, SD leader Tadeusz W. Mlynczak, and Chairman of the PRON National Council Jan Dobraczynski.

Also present were members of the Politburo and the PZPR CC Secretariat: Kazimierz Barcikowski, Tadeusz Czechowicz, Jozef Czyrek, Stefan Olszowski, Tadeusz Porebski, Albin Siwak, Marian Wozniak, Jan Glowczyk, Czeslaw Kiszczak, Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak, Florian Siwicki, Henryk Bednarski, Zbigniew Michalek, and Waldemar Swirgon.

The reception took place in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere.

A gala concert organized by the Ministry of Culture and Arts and the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society was the highlight of the Polish celebrations of the October Revolution anniversary.

The concert was attended by Zbigniew Messner and other personalities. Speeches were made by Jan Glowczyk and Aleksandr Aksyonov. (PAP)

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TRADE UNIONISTS APPEAL FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 1

[Abridged]

[Text] A special celebration--although its participants stressed primarily the practical side of the event--was held on November 7 at the Metallurgical Combine of the Lenin steelmill in Cracow to commemorate the 68th anniversary of the October Revolution.

The representatives of trade unions in the four Polish enterprises which bear Lenin's name, namely the Gdansk shipyard, the heat and power plant in Lodz, the coal mine in Myslowice-Wesola and the Metallurgical Combine in Cracow, signed a cooperation agreement and an appeal addressed to workers and trade unions in all enterprises. The document reads:

"On the 68th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the trade unions in enterprises bearing Lenin's name call on trade unionists and all employees to expand activities designed to increase management effectiveness and shape patriotic, socialist attitudes. The purpose is to expand the trade unions' role in developing and popularizing scientific and technological progress and inventions, promoting the economical management of materials and power among the workforce, improving the quality of products and services, and developing independent economic activities and autonomous production teams in enterprises. At the same time, we should encourage all efforts to popularize civic knowledge among unionists and workers, to widen the appeal of national culture and to promote working people's active participation in it, to promote sport and tourism and expand the base for active relaxation. All these tasks stem from Lenin's concept of trade unions. We think that the trade unions' basic role, that of protecting working people's interests, will be well served when the union movement plays a greater part in increasing the national income and shaping social awareness.

"We think that the trade unions will be strengthened by taking up these initiatives, which will also serve the interests of working people well."

On behalf of all Polish unionists, Deputy Chairman of the All-Poland Trades Union Alliance (OPZZ), Romuald Sosnowski, extended greetings to all working people in the Soviet Union and to the Vice-Consul of the Soviet Consulate General in Cracow, Wlodzimierz Onosza, and good wishes for the successful building of Communism.

When discussing the importance of the October Revolution for the world, Onosza emphasized that one of its unquestionable gains was the concept of peaceful coexistence. "On this anniversary," he said, "I wish peace and calm to you, your children and grandchildren."

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COMMISSION FOR LABOR CODE AMENDMENTS MEETS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 4

[Text] The Commission for Amendments to the Labor Code held its third plenary meeting on November 7.

The subject of the meeting, which was chaired by the Minister of Labor, Pay and Social Security, Stanislaw Gebala, were the amendments proposed to the Labor Code with regard to the tasks and powers of trade unions. The proposed amendments, which adapt the Code to the new structure, position and rights of trade unions, were presented by the head of the working team for trade unions, Rajmund Moric.

During its first meeting, which was held nearly two months ago, the Commission pronounced these issues to be most urgent and expressed the opinion that for social and economic reasons they should be dealt with by the end of this year. Along with trade union problems, those related to the economic reform, the status of managerial personnel, social discipline and the rationalization of employment should be solved by that time. However, the Commission's work so far indicates that it will not be easy to finish this work on time. The reason is the complexity of these problems and the controversies on many issues, which are unavoidable in a commission composed of experts on the Labor Code and social activists.

Differences of views also arose during the last meeting. They concerned the decisions involving individual employees' problems (e.g., dismissal from work) with trade unions. The trade unionists participating in the Commission's work would like to preserve the existing, two-level consultation procedure and make it possible to bring the contentious cases before a nationwide trade union organization.

However, the majority of Commission members would like to restrict this consultation to the union at factory-level. They invoke such arguments as the changed structure of the trade union movement, (in which the federation is not superior to the factory union) the independence of enterprises and the disbandment of bodies superior to those enterprises which are covered by the economic reform. Another difficulty would be that some trade unions are not members of any nationwide organization. It was pointed out that in the case of a difference of view between a manager and a trade union the contentious issue would not be resolved by higher-level consultation anyway, while the interests of employees would be safeguarded by the opportunity of bringing an appeal to a court, the ultimate decision-maker on those issues.

There are some more such problems to be solved in the course of the Commission's further work. It has been generally agreed that the amendments to the Labor Code concerning trade unions should consist primarily in adapting the Code's provisions to those of the laws on trade unions and self-management, which are of essential importance to the socioeconomic system of the country. Especially important are the consequences to the Labor Code of the new, partnership-based model of cooperation between the administration and trade unions. In this model, speakers in the discussion said, the strength of arguments and not the strength of voice should decide. It is according to this criterion that the Commission should decide which issues require consultations between managers and trade unions.

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OLSZOWSKI RECEIVES LIBYAN ENVOY

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 2

[Text] PZPR Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski yesterday received the charge d'affaires of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ahmed A. Bukhreis. The Libyan diplomat conveyed a letter from the secretary of the Libyan Bureau for External Relations, Ali Treiki, relating to the publication by the American press of U.S. special services terrorist plans directed against the Libyan Jamahiriya.

Minister Olszowski condemned the U.S. policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the resort to state terrorism. He assured the diplomat of Poland's full solidarity with the Libyan Jamahiriya in the face of the actions of U.S. imperialism, as now exposed.

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URBAN ON NATIONAL CONCILIATION 'CROSSROADS'

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Jan Rem]

[Text] Some people complain that national conciliation embraces only particular groups. Participation in public life, according to these critics, is reduced to those currents which have joined the PRON movement. This is a mistaken view, because for example, the Polish Episcopate and the wide network of Church-sponsored clubs, institutions, organizations and journals are also present on the public scene. Perhaps it is true that this particular participation is somewhat separatist in nature.

Long before the October general election, General Jaruzelski expressed an opinion which can be interpreted in the following way: the PRON movement is the basic and most comprehensive platform of political participation in Poland, but this does not mean that other forces or groups which up to now have not joined that movement cannot join in a nationwide dialogue, provided they stand by the constitutional principles of the Polish state. The platform for dialogue can and should be expanded and strengthened.

Now that the election is over it is perhaps useful to resume the discussion on how to ensure the widest possible national conciliation. The election disclosed the true extent of public approval for the PRON platform and the general policy of the state. It put in true proportion the gap between this public approval and hopes for toppling the system. The estimated proportion of those who are looking forward to such a system replacement is just a few percent of the total population. Only a handful of individuals work actively toward this goal. Prosocialist forces have become more conspicuous. They have been reassured by noting the extent of their influence as measured by the support they get from a majority. This of course makes it easier, rather than harder, to expand the scope of dialogue and conciliation. Nobody interprets the election results as a political opportunity to slam the door on anyone who did not go to the polls. It would be a grave mistake if we interpreted the turnout figure as a rigid limit on the field of dialogue and conciliation. Nobody says we don't care about the remaining twenty percent of the population who may well remain outside public life in Poland. Just the opposite is true. The electoral returns demonstrate that stabilization has reached a stage at which dialogue can be expanded without the chance of weakening the state. The election strengthened the PRON movement, the party and its allies as the senior partner in the bid for national conciliation.

At the same time, the election further confirmed the political arguments of those who say that the active enemies of socialism, the entire extremist anti-state orientation, should not be admitted to join the dialogue. Some foreign and Polish observers of the Polish political scene have been saying in recent years that, without reaching some kind of agreement with at least some members of the former Solidarity union and with some of their advisers, the policy line followed by the party, the government and PRON will fail to win a wide enough measure of public support to make the election a success. The election dispelled all doubts of this kind. The election put an end to such doubts, especially considering the calls to stay away from the polls.

The period before and around the election cast a glaring light on the political designs of those who called for a boycott. Since their call for a boycott and now, since the election, the political position of the system's enemies has become even more transparent. Even Western commentators have ceased arguing that the enemies are seeking some accommodation. All smokescreens have disappeared. The enemies no longer make any bones about their expectation of a new crisis in Poland, doing all they can to add new difficulties to old and deluding themselves that in this way they can bring closer the long-desired day of all-out conflict. They openly express their worries about all that is good in Poland and give vent to their joy over that which is bad. They believe that the worse the nation's situation becomes, the better things go for their cause. They openly identify themselves with, and lean politically and financially against, a foreign power which is trying to harm Poland. The weaker they grow, the more obviously they become an agency of foreign interests, like a new edition of [late 18th-century pro-Tsarist conspiracy] Targowica in the late 20th century.

These circumstances support the arguments for setting limits to the scope of national conciliation. The offer of dialogue holds for all patriotic realists who want no new crisis but stability in Poland, those who are ready to respect the constitutional order of the only really existing Poland, whether or not deep in their heart they are happy about the present system. They are willing to reach compromise solutions and tend to be moderate because they see that by keeping within these limits they do not jeopardize Poland's supreme national interest. Consequently, they can expand their part in Poland's public life and have some influence on the direction of its future development.

It is no secret that the political forces working inside PRON wanted the Sejm to become the widest possible representation of Polish society. The idea was not so much to attract the various individuals who walk their own winding roads and who represent only themselves and their own meandering views, as the incomparably more serious goal of attracting those Catholic activists who are trusted by the Church hierarchy. Just how great their participation might be remained a matter for discussion. In any case, the offer was turned down. Yet despite that negative reaction, despite the fact that (except for a few) Roman Catholic bishops did not go to the polls and only few lower-ranking priests did, the post-August post-December policy line obtained a 79-percent support from society. Now it is, politically, a very significant fact that such a high proportion of support could be won independently [without the Church's backing].

In previous years the Church's top leaders used to take a close interest in parliamentary work. On various occasions they came forward with their own detailed assessments of proposed Sejm laws. They tried to influence the final shape of some laws by speaking from outside, as a major opinion-forming factor. Those suggestions were always considered scrupulously and, as far as it was possible, the Sejm took account of them.

But now we have the following situation: some leading lay Catholics with close ties to the Church hierarchy unfortunately received no encouragement from the Church to run as candidates, the clergy's participation in the election was poor, and yet the Episcopate is still taking a close interest in public life and speaks its mind on various essentially political affairs, to the extent of trying occasionally to influence the shape of some proposed laws. This, then, is indicative of a very peculiar kind of political participation, trying to influence public life as much as this is possible, but shying away from taking even the slightest share of responsibility for it.

Participation in the decision-making process at national level, in any form, necessarily involves co-responsibility. In this situation, shirking any responsibility is therefore, to put it mildly, a questionable attitude both from the political and the moral point of view.

Before election day, ranking Churchmen spoke about their neutrality toward the election motivated by the purely religious of the Church. This kind of neutrality is perfectly understandable, if it implies a constant abidance to the principle of Church-state separation and an emphasis on the purely religious program of actions pursued by a religious institution. However, this claim of neutrality and non-involvement in politics was unfortunately invalidated by the many sermons and events staged in churches when the call for a boycott was explicitly or implicitly backed. Even on the day of the election itself quite a few such sermons could have been heard.

Moreover, all attempts to stage anti-election demonstrations on election day were scheduled to coincide, in time and place, with some religious ceremonies. Nor did the proportion of voting priests, bishops, monks, nuns and alumni of seminaries--without any subsequent clear political interpretation of that poor turnout figure to distinguish it from a boycott--bear out the Church's neutrality claim.

Neutrality might be respected if it was authentic and consistent, resting on agreement on words with deeds, and if nonparticipation in the Sejm by some individuals trusted by the Church leaders, could be said to betoken a neutral attitude toward parliamentary work.

Then it would not even be necessary to consider whether or not such a neutrality follows from Christian doctrine. Viewed in this context, it would be interesting to hear if the proportion of priests going to the polls in Hungary, or the presence of churchmen in the Hungarian parliament, are symptoms of some Hungarian schism or only of a different interpretation of the Church's duties toward the state?

Time will show whether the Church will stand by its neutrality and if it will do so consistently. It is not unlikely that the state authorities will show understanding both for the Church's genuine neutrality and for its embarkation on the road of civic participation, a road which may lead to a search for common points of cooperation for the well-being of the people and the state.

The party, the state administration and PRON alike are sometimes accused, in publications and during some discussions, that their declarations of a desire to expand the scope of national conciliation are not followed by deeds. This is a wrong allegation, as can be seen from the above-cited offer (unfortunately addressed to only a small number of people) to lay Catholics with ties to the Episcopate to run for the Sejm, yet sometimes even those columnists and politicians who themselves refuse to join the dialogue and the cause for conciliation, still complain that the extent of this is too narrow.

Let me illustrate that method of refusal with an example. One lay Catholic from a group which is probably trusted by the bishops, namely from the TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY weekly, contacted the state administration. This man is described as a neoconservative by some Western commentators. He represents a small group of people who say that socialism already exists and should be regarded as a permanent fact in Poland. He says underground activity makes no sense. He wants to respect the law, to participate in public life legally and to disseminate his critical views about the policies pursued by PRON signatories with a touch of realism and responsibility in his arguments. The group which presented itself in this fashion wished to start publishing its own journal in order to explain its own position and to join in the circulation of ideas.

The officials who heard the proposal for starting a new journal said, "All right, go ahead." He also said the best thing would be to start by publishing the idea of new journal, that is, to present the proposed journal's future shape and the editors' self-description as a group committed to definite ideas. That seemed a natural form of starting such a project. It was agreed that the group would publish what and where it wanted. The official openly agreed that his suggestion to get the future journal's program published before the journal itself, was motivated by cautiousness. Sometimes, as had happened before, things that were said during conversations in small closed circles later appeared differently in print.

The man from the Catholic group accepted this argument and thought the offer was fair. A program was then drawn up, but it failed to appear in print. It appeared that the group's plan generated different opinions inside its own community. The whole design has therefore been dropped for the time being. The authorities are well aware that some ideas and processes take time to mature. This is why they have refrained from flaunting this affair in public to say, "Look, we are committed to an expansion of freedom of expression and of national conciliation, but when it comes to doing something about it, some people on their own initiative step back."

A hue and cry was raised by the Paris-based KULTURA monthly, and later also by another Western journal. Somebody calling himself Leopolda wrote in KULTURA that the man who talked to the authorities was duped, that they played a cunning trick on him. He was also accused of having had lunch during his

talks at the office where he appeared. That means he allowed himself to be corrupted by swallowing the canteen soup. The essential meaning of Leopold's attack in KULTURA, however, is that founding a legal journal which would preach opinions different from those promoted by the authorities is tantamount to a coup de grace administered to the almost moribund underground and all its legal little newssheets.

I do admit that the irritation is not unfounded. The underground newssheets on the whole survive because of Western funds and they express views which follow the line of the providers. Their maintenance is justified by the alleged lack of freedom of expression in Poland. Now that argument is invalidated by expanding the scope of liberties in official public life. The inexorable progress of dialogue and conciliation is lethal for the underground and for its xeroxed organs, so it is only natural that the illegal and other radical antisocialists should put pressure on those who spurn socialism as an idea and who are critical of the authorities' policies but who, as realists, want to respect constitutional principles, to act openly, and to join in the dialogue. Dissenters who act legally undermine the allegations about an intolerant regime stifling all independent thought.

The extremists are doing everything they can to prevent an expansion of national conciliation, and then blame the authorities for failing to expand the scope of the dialogue. It is not the party or the government, but the antisocialist extremists, who are doing everything to make sure that between the domain of Zbigniew Bujak, Lech Walesa and Frs. Jankowski, Bogucki and Jancarz and that of the PRON movement there should be a no-man's land, which they claim as their own. They resort to brutal pressure in doing this. Lies are only some of their tools. Discussing the above-mentioned case, B. Osadczuk in the NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG claims falsely that the authorities agreed to start a new journal by what are called neoconservatives, in return for allowing a representative of the proposed journal's editors to run as candidate in the election and for accepting that group's support for the election. This is not true. The Swiss paper further says the authorities also urged the group to make another concession, namely to publish something like a manifesto in one Catholic journal appearing in Cracow.

The allegation about the authorities demanding political concessions is another lie. The Zurich daily goes on lying when it says the government failed to meet some of its promises, that the Pope intervened etc.--all of it sensational nonsense, the purpose of which is to terrorize all those outside PRON who might be thinking of expanding the spectrum of political dialogue.

The chance to expand national conciliation and broaden dialogue is determined--especially now, after the election--less by the forces inside the PRON movement or on the authorities, than by other potential partners in a nationwide dialogue.

The abortive attempt to start a new journal is just one example of the truth that participation in normal, legal political life in Poland is objectively and subjectively impossible without cutting all ties to those who believe that the U.S. President best represents Polish interests, and that a new and even greater crisis should ravage Poland, for the worse things go in Poland the better the situation becomes, for in such a case all would soon crumble.

Participation in public life is incompatible with toeing the line of extremists and underground activists, who act in collaboration with some foreign embassies. Such a thing is simply impossible, for you cannot want the situation in Poland to go both worse and better simultaneously, you cannot weaken the country and strengthen it at the same time. Any group intending to act in the open must of necessity cut all ties to the active underground and not solely because of the logic of politics. The episode with the abortive journal voicing neoconservative ideas demonstrates clearly that those who want to act legally and sensibly must distance themselves unequivocally from the extremists, otherwise the latter will use all their influence to torpedo whatever the "legalists" try to do.

Whatever the conclusions may be arrived at by the larger and smaller forces of the "center" now, after the election--and they display a lot of indecision and inconsistency at present--they should first realize some truths. First, it is all their own choice. Second, our offer for a difficult dialogue stands. Third, those who stay away deprive themselves of any influence on the present and future of Poland. Fourth, we have enough forces about us, enough accomplishments and stamina to travel our firm and well-tested road on our own.

The offer for conciliation and dialogue can be accepted or turned down, but no one has the right to say that PRON or the authorities are not reaching out a hand, because lying is a religious sin, but a lie which nobody believes is a political sin.

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POLAND

NEW CC SECRETARY WOZNIAK

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Nov 85 p 2

[Text] Marian Wozniak was born in 1936 at Dabrowica to an intelligentsia family. He graduated from Poznan Academy of Economics in 1957 and started work at the Zielona Gora Voivodship Economic Planning Commission. In the years 1961-65 he was head of the investment planning department of the Plock oil refinery and petrochemical works and at the same time he was Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Works PZPR Committee, an unpaid assignment.

Next, he was deputy director of the Petrobudowa firm. In the years 1967-70 he was Chairman of the Presidium of the Plock People's Council, and until 1973 Deputy Chairman of the Warsaw Voivodship People's Council. In the years 1973-78 he was deputy director and then director of a team for local planning in the Government Planning Commission. He was appointed deputy Siedlce voivod in 1979. In June 1981, a Siedlce voivodship PZPR conference chose him as First Secretary of the Voivodship Committee.

Starting from the 9th PZPR Congress, Marian Wozniak has been a member of the Central Committee. The 1st Plenum elected him CC secretary. The 7th Plenum elected him substitute Politburo member in February 1982. In June 1982 he was elected First Secretary of the Warsaw PZPR Committee, and in July 1982, Politburo member. Marian Wozniak is a member of the CC Economic Reform and Economic Policy Commission and the Chairman of the Public Committee for the Construction of an Oncological Center. He has been a party member for 25 years. He holds the Commander's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

On October 13, 1985, Wozniak was elected deputy to the 9th Sejm.

On November 11 this year, the 22d Plenum elected him CC Secretary. (PAP)

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POLAND

COURT ACTIVITIES HIGHLIGHTED

Supreme Court Protects Civil Rights

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Sep 85 p 5

[Interview by Tomasz Arleth; date and place not specified]

[Text] Has the 5-year work of the Supreme Administrative Court [NSA] confirmed the public's need for judicial regulation of administrative decisions? To what extent has it met citizen expectations in this regard? A PAP journalist took these questions to the president of the NSA, Adam Zielinski. Following are extensive excerpts of that conversation.

[Question] How far can the court's regulation reach?

[Answer] The NSA regulates the conformity of administrative decisions to law. It evaluates administrative compliance with regulations that define the rights and responsibilities of citizens in various spheres of public life. At the same time it determines whether an administrative decision has been issued in the required manner, whether the facts have been properly interpreted, whether the citizen has been permitted to present his grounds and whether he has been assured the opportunity for counsel.

In any case judicial regulation cannot exempt the administration from its responsibility for proper, competent and effective work. However, the court arms toward eliminating arbitrariness, wilfulness and arrogance in deciding cases, toward the administration's being legitimate and, as a consequence, just. And that it be able to unite the public interest with the citizen's valid interest.

[Question] The court has repealed an administrative decision or declared it invalid. How valid are the complaints submitted to the NSA?

[Answer] We have observed, over a long interval, a certain decline in that validity. In 1981 valid complaints totaled about 41 percent and in 1984 only 32 percent. Surely this testifies to an improvement in the administration's work. One must also appreciate that the number of complaints reaching the NSA

still constitutes only a small percentage in relation to all the decision issued by the administration each year.

[Question] The NSA not only adjudicates but also carries out broad preventive action. What form does it take and specifically what are its effects?

[Answer] We attach a great deal of weight to this action, which has the prevention of future violations of the law as its goal. We feel that it is no less necessary than proper adjudication in specific cases. We inform the administration about those irregularities citizens complain about most often, about which infringements have been repeated. We participate in publicizing administrative law among civil servants as well as among the public. And the needs in this regard, despite efforts undertaken by the department of administration and space management, are still very great. Not only is administrative law extensive; it also changes often and expert annotations and manuals are lacking.

Our action aims toward standardization of legal interpretations, toward regulations' meaning the same thing, regardless of which administrative body applies them. We interpret the principles on which our law is based, principles of legality and equality and the substance and scope of specific rights and responsibilities of citizens. We want to make administrative law more intelligible and comprehensible for citizens and for the administration.

[Question] The duties of the NSA are growing. Does an improvement in the conditions of its activity go along with this, does the judicial organization, which now operates in Warsaw and six other cities, assure citizens practical access to the administrative judiciary?

[Answer] The organizational structure of the NSA must reconcile two elements: it must ensure uniformity of adjudication and facilitate citizen contact with the courts. The present organization of the court answers that need. It is inappropriate to accuse ourselves on the occasion of our own kind of "anniversary." But it is a fact that in the court's Warsaw seat, we are already short of space. In this regard the situation in the Poznan center is also bad. But we reckon that local conditions for the court will gradually improve.

Accelerated Ruling Speeds Court Decisions

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] In July and August of this year, charges against 6,534 people came into the courts under accelerated procedures. We recall that the ruling on such procedures means prompt trying of cases and, moreover, significantly more severe penalties. These are crimes whose commission as a rule is beyond question; the perpetrator has been caught in the act or immediately thereafter. The accelerated procedure has been in force in the entire country since 1 July. The courts have tried 5,154 people under this procedure through the end of August.

The courts most often passed sentences of unqualified imprisonment on the guilty. Some 2,147 people received that penalty. Another 638 were sentenced to limited imprisonment. The courts also passed sentences of imprisonment on 1,080 people but suspended the sentences for the test period.

Economic penalties have become much more stringent. In sentencing perpetrators to imprisonment, the courts also imposed fines of from 50 to 100 thousand zloties on nearly 1,300 people. Fines of over 100 thousand zloties were imposed on 269 defendants. Under the accelerated procedure the courts sought additional penalties on a broad scale. For example, making the substance of the verdicts public was ordered against 2,667 people; that is, against about 52 percent of the defendants in proceedings of this kind. In 255 cases injunctions were issued against occupying certain positions or carrying on specific activity, such as a trade or craft.

Those accused of unlawful production of alcohol most often came before the court under the accelerated procedure. Some 833 people were sentenced for such offenses. Another 496 were penalized for theft of private property and 433 for theft of public property. During this time 430 were also charged with burglary. In July and August the courts tried 411 people charged with profiteering and 214 accused of avoidance of work responsibilities under the accelerated procedure.

Revised penal law reinstated the use of the so-called peremptory procedure. In minor cases in which evidentiary proceedings are relatively simple, the court can issue peremptory penalties. A legally valid order is subject to execution like a court sentence. The accused is entitled to enter an objection which signifies a demand to try to case under common law.

From 1 July to the end of August, 4,512 orders were issued. The courts most often adjudged limited imprisonment or fines in these cases. The additional penalty of publication of the sentences was sought in 412 cases. In nearly every fifth case the defendants took advantage of the right to enter an objection. In the remaining, the orders were executed, concluding the penal proceedings.

Priest Forces Churchgoing; Sentenced

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] The trial of Rev. Edward G., vicar of a Roman Catholic parish in Srokow, has been completed before the District Court in Ketrzyn (Olsztyn province). He was charged with violating the rights of citizens to freedom of religious practice. The indictment charged that Rev. Edward G. forced children and adults to take part in religious services by means of psychological pressure, offensive language and blows.

We recall that the investigation against him commenced after 29 May 1985, when at a State Motor Transport bus stop he struck a 19 year old technical school student in the face for not greeting the priest "in a Catholic manner."

In the course of the two-day trial, the court examined 42 witnesses, mostly victims. The court found Rev. Edward G. guilty of the charges and on the basis of Article 196 of the Penal Code, he was sentenced to one year in prison with a four year suspension and was fined 100 thousand zloties. In addition, the court imposed an additional penalty prohibiting Rev. Edward G. from conducting catechism classes for children and young people for four years.

The sentence is not legally binding.

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POLAND

LABOR, UNION ISSUES FEATURED

Gorzow Province Notes Trade Union Growth

Zielona Gora GAZETA LUBUSKA in Polish 16 Oct 85 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Development of Trade Unions in Gorzow Voivodship"]

[Text] Trade union ranks are consistently swelling in Gorzow Voivodship. At the beginning of this October, there were 394 trade union organizations with 73,283 members, or 51.9 percent of the total number of persons employed in plants in which they can exist.

Krzeszyce, Beloszkowice, Miedzichowo, Nowogrodek, Pszczew, and Zwierzyn gminas have workplaces with the largest numbers of trade union members, while Kost-rzyn, Gorzow, and Sulecin gminas have the fewest.

This September the plant trade union organizations focused their operations and activity on participation in drafting new wage incentive systems, reviewing work stations, seeing that occupational health and safety regulations are being enforced, improving the social and living conditions of workers, facilitating winter fruits and vegetables, and taking part in the Sejm elections campaign.

Activists think further union movement integration is needed in terms of both regional structures and branches of industry. This September further town-gminna talks were held with the trade unions in Strzelce Krajenkie. There are now 12 local trade agreements in Gorzow Voivodship.

Preparations are under way for the voivodship trade union agreement congress planned for this November. Drafts of some of the documents have already been completed, including those regarding WPZZ activity regulations, nominations for elections, and ideological-program guidelines of the WPZZ.

The Polish Teachers Union is one of the fastest growing unions in Gorzow Voivodship, and 61 percent of all persons employed in education are members. During the organization's recent district administration meeting attended by department chairmen, the agenda featured the program for commemoration of National Education Day and the 80th anniversary of the ZNP, and a working plan covering the rest of this terms of office was adopted.

There has also been a great increase recently in the ranks of those organizations belonging to the Public Health Employees Trade Union Federation. The voivodship council of the federation includes 18 union organization members.

Boards' interest in the apprentices of plant schools, in interns, and in newly hired employees has helped build the number of trade union members.

Union Publishing House 35th Anniversary

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19-20 Oct 85 p 2

[Article: "Thirty-fifth Anniversary of Union Office"]

[Text]: The Trade Union Publishing Institute (Instytut Wydawniczy Zwiaskow Zawodowych) is celebrating its 35th anniversary. It has a long list of credits: more than 4,000 titles published, nearly 2,000 posters totalling more than 110 million copies printed, and millions of intraorganizational bulletins issued.

Its directors met with Tadeusz Porebski, Politburo member and secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, on the occasion of the institute's anniversary.

Expansion of editorial activity to make it possible to satisfy all the literary needs of workers and their families was considered the most important issue for the publishing house, along with providing necessary raw materials for production and stepping up the process of modernizing the union press.

Also present at the meeting were Stanislaw Gabrielski, director of the PZPR Central Committee's Social and Professional Department, and Romuald Sosnowski, vice chairman of OPZZ.

Working Class Role in Sociopolitical Life

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19-20 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Tadeusz Kujanek: "Role of the Working Class in Social and Political Life: Plenum of the Poznan PZPR Voivodship Committee"]

[Text] A plenary meeting of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Poznan was held at the iron foundry of the H. Cegielski Metal Industry Plants in Srem on 18 October.

The meeting was devoted to the tasks of bolstering the working class' role in the social and political life of Poznan Voivodship. The deliberations were chaired by Edward Lukasik, first secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee and were also attended by two Central Committee Politburo members: Stanislaw Kalkus and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek. An invitation was also extended to workers who had attended the 16th Central Committee Plenum and the National Party Conference.

Grzegorz Romanowski, secretary of the Voivodship Committee, read the report of the executive board, which stated that before the plenary session analyses

had been made upon which the assessments and conclusions were based. For example analyses had been made of worker participation in various realms of social and political life, using examples from several dozen basic party organizations, low-level party units, and plant committees. Many changes have occurred in this area since the August "events." The basic way to increase worker interest in the work of party organizations is to build moral authority and develop effective action within the group. This should be done, for example, through open party meetings and public consultations to tap public opinion and to learn the views and opinions of workers.

The attitudes of the worker milieu are a decisive element in the development of the political situation on a general social scale. It was stated that despite various sorts of fluctuations, these attitudes are showing a clear increase in trust in the actions of the authorities and greater and greater acceptance of the ways of handling major socioeconomic problems.

Numerous problems related to the activity of party organizations operating among workers were brought up in a broad comprehensive discussion, especially with regard to organizations in large plants.

Taking the floor, Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek expressed thanks on behalf of the Politburo and Gen W. Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee, to party activists, political bodies, and social organizations for their work on the campaign prior to elections to the Sejm and the outcome of the elections themselves. In connection with the subject matter of the discussions the speaker pointed out the need for consistent implementation of the decisions of the 16th Central Committee Plenum to bolster the role of the working class in the socialist state. The necessity of socioeconomic development of the country poses new tasks for us which must be carried out on the basis of scientific technical expertise and the technical improvements and innovations movement.

Plenum participants were familiarized with the initial analysis of the outcome of the Sejm elections in the voivodship. The society's universal participation in pre-election meetings and in the voting itself show that the society has come out in favor of the process of reform and the socialist renewal, and for national understanding.

'Hard-Drinking Poles' Theory Refuted

Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 11 Oct 85 p 3

[Interview with Adam Dunalewicz, Government Press Office Director: "Is It True that Poles Drink a Lot and Work Little?"]

[Text] [Question] This is a rather provocative question: Is it true that Poles as a nation are overly inclined to drink and simultaneously not very inclined to put in a good hard day's work consistently? The propaganda-mongers in the West inimical to us are spreading these notions and similar ones all over.

[Answer] First of all, let me say a few words about this alleged disinclination to work, which various self-appointed "reviewers" of Poland and the Poles attribute to us. Basically the whole history of our nation and Polish achievements in the field of material and spiritual culture show this hypothesis to be a lie. Despite many difficulties with raw materials, personnel, and cooperation agreements and the like, most plants are meeting their planned targets. Labor productivity in 1985 is higher than it was in 1979. At the same time, we must remember that employment throughout the socialized economy dropped by about 700,000. We are not a nation of alcoholics. Most Poles work honestly and reliably.

[Question] Well, but it is true that there are elbow-benders among us.

[Answer] True. Every nation has its disease, and in this country it is alcoholism, and it has been with us. In our history there was even a time when people had to drink. This is therefore a special social habit, an inherited problem. Habits can be changed, and habits like drunkenness must be, but the change does not come easily. It takes time. The church, for example, has been taking up this problem since time immemorial.

Government agencies and social organizations have decisively taken up the gauntlet against alcoholism. The 1983 law on sobriety and the fight against alcoholism was the thing that started getting people into action on this problem.

In such a short time it has been difficult to change customs which have been in effect in certain social groups, to develop the custom of sobriety, or to alter the structure of alcohol consumption, but during this period the rise in alcohol consumption has been arrested. In 1980 it was 8.4 liters per person, but since 1981 the figures year by year were 6.4, 6.1, and 6.3. In 1984 there was also some improvement in the structure of market deliveries. The deliveries in low-proof beverages quadrupled in relation to 1983. There has been a decline in the number of outlets selling beverages containing more than 4.5 percent alcohol. In 1983 the target was to reduce the number of these outlets to 33,350. In fact there are already far fewer, 27,800. There has also been improvement in the detoxification situation. Four establishments have been completed and eight modernized. Sanctions have been increased for violation of the alcohol law.

[Question] In other words: People are drinking less, but there are still reasons for energetic efforts to fight alcoholism where the problem is the most acute.

[Answer] Yes. For example, inspectors in 2,152 plants recently found 61,000 instances of alcohol consumption in the workplace, and one person out of every four caught is found to be under the influence. And these are facts which make us both reflect and take energetic action.

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU ADDRESSES RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE

AU201505 [Editorial Report] Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian on 15 and 16 November devotes the inside pages to speeches made at the 13-14 November plenum of the RCP Central Committee by various participants, including prominent party-government leaders. All the speeches--as rendered by the newspaper--averaging between 700 and 2,500 words, deal extensively with tasks devolving on relevant economic branches from the draft 1986 uniform plan for socioeconomic development; effusively praise Ceausescu's leadership and personality; fully support the party-state domestic and foreign policy; fully endorse all documents discussed at the plenum; accept responsibility for shortcomings in various fields; and pledge, on behalf of the working people in the respective sectors, to unswervingly implement all party-state decisions.

Gheorghe Pana, member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP Central Committee, first secretary of the Bucharest Municipality RCP Committee, and Bucharest mayor, speaks in general terms about achievements and concerns in Bucharest, with emphasis on the "need to further reduce the consumption of electrical energy, fuel, and natural gas." In this respect, steps have been taken, as of last October, "to observe allocation quotas in accordance with the winter program." As for agriculture, "in spite of difficult weather conditions, certain satisfactory results were attained this year."

Gheorghe Stoica, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and first secretary of Folj County RCP Committee--after briefly reviewing the overall situation in his country--dwells extensively on shortcomings in the agricultural sector, where "the main blame does not lie with the drought, but rather with shortcomings in the management of this sector."

In his speech, Nicolae Mihalache, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP Central Committee and first secretary of Constanta County RCP Committee, admits that "we are not satisfied with results attained thus far in the industry, but particularly in the agriculture of the county." He pledges to take steps to "strengthen discipline and order" in these fields and "improve the management of these sectors".

Stefan Rab, member of the RCP Central Committee, and first secretary of Covasna County RCP Committee, talking about his county's achievements and concerns that "although the majority of economic units have fulfilled and overfulfilled plan provisions the failure by several units to do the same has led to the county's failure to fully attain the overall county plan."

Neculai Agachi, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and minister of metallurgical industry, talks exclusively about his field, where "serious shortcomings have led to failure to fulfill the itemized and value production as well as the investment and export plans." He says that efforts are being made to remedy this negative state of affairs and "to ensure contracts for the coming year."

Gheorghe Dinu, member of the RCP Central Committee and minister of chemical industry, says that "in spite of efforts made by the working people, one must self-critically admit that the ministry has failed to fulfill all tasks for the first 10 months of 1985." The blame for these drawbacks in the chemical industry "lies with the management council of the ministry and other collective management bodies."

Mihai Moraru, member of the RCP Central Committee and minister of heavy equipment, says that the industrial production and labor productivity in his sector "will attain an 8 percent growth rate this year," in spite of various shortcomings--particularly in the delivery of products on schedule--which must be eliminated.

Gheorghe David, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and minister of agriculture and food industry, says that "examining with communist responsibility the work and results in 1985, we must report that they were not satisfactory and up to the possibilities of our socialist agriculture. The failure to fully implement plan provisions for the vegetable, animal, and export production is mainly due to insufficient concern on behalf of those in the ministry, certain county agricultural bodies, and certain management councils in units." He proceeds to enumerate various poor results, particularly "delays in harvesting wheat, sunflower, soya and corn." He pledges, on behalf of all agricultural workers, to strive harder in 1986, when an "11.9-14 percent increase in the overall agricultural output" is envisaged.

Ioan Avram, member of the RCP Central Committee, who was released last month from the position of deputy prime minister in charge of energy, for deficiencies registered in the energy sector, and later appointed minister of industrial construction, is quoted by the newspaper as saying that he has "drawn all necessary lessons from shortcomings in his work, so that they may not occur again." He expresses "profound gratitude to our party leadership, for its particular care of its cadres, and to Party Secretary General Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu personally, who has further entrusted me with a highly responsible job." He then discusses in general terms future tasks in the industrial construction branch.

Nicolae Busui, former minister of electric power dismissed last month for deficiencies in the energy sector, reported that he takes "personal blame for all shortcomings" in the electric power sector. He considers his dismissal "as fully justified" and "assures the party Central Committee and the much esteemed and beloved Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu that, in the new job that will be entrusted to me, I will never forget the mistakes made in the past and I will do everything, sparing no effort, to exemplarily fulfill all tasks."

According to the newspaper, Ion Licu, member of the RCP Central Committee and newly appointed minister of electric power, fully endorsed "the serious criticism made by the party secretary general in connection with deficiencies in the energy field." He goes on to say that "the main cause for the nonfulfillment of plan tasks and the present situation of the national energy system was first and foremost the lack of discipline in all aspects" and that "immediate steps have been taken to implement the decree on instituting a state of emergency and the militarized labor regime" in various units.

After discussing various future tasks in the energy sector, the speaker says that special attention will be paid to reducing specific fuel and energy consumption, with plans existing for "saving about one million metric tons of conventional fuel and over 400 million kWh," by modernizing outdated installations and other measures. He pledges, on behalf of all energy workers "to commendably fulfill all provisions of the plan and programs for ensuring the electric power required by our national economy."

/9738

CSO: 2020/40

ROMANIA

CHURCHES RESTORED IN TRANSYLVANIA

AU081242 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 0950 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 8 Nov, 85--The bimonthly TRIBUNA ROMANIEI, edited by the Association "Romania", announced in its first issue of November the conclusion of the restoration operations performed on the church at Cimpeni-deal, a locality situated in the Apuseni Mountains. This house of party was restored and repainted as part of the extensive works of reconstructing and maintaining historic and cultural monuments in Romania. In Transylvania, alone, such operations were conducted on more than 40 Orthodox churches, under the Metropolitan Church of Transylvania, in the last few months. In the commune of Belisul Nou, Cluj County, a locality that was given a new location after a dam had been erected on the Somesu Cald, a church built from state funds was recently opened to religious services. Walls were consolidated and old pictures refaced with funds allotted by the state and with the contribution of the faithful at the churches and historic and art monuments at Moeciu de jos, Harasov County, Lunca Mures, Lui Alba County, Tirnicioara, Sibiu County, Noul Roman, Brasov County, as well as the wooden church at Poian, Maramures County.

Maintenance and painting works were performed on other churches as well, such as those at Rona de Jos, Maramuras County, Singorz-bai, Bistrita-Nasaud County, Valea Vinului, Satu Mare County, Toplita, Mures County, Salonta, Bihor County, Recea, Salaj County, and Bont, Cluj County.

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CSO: 2020/40

ROMANIA

PEC DISCUSSES 1986 PLAN; CONVENES CC PLENUM

AU081930 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1910 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES, 8 Nov, 85--Gathering on 8 November under the chairmanship of RCP General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu, the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP looked into the report on the draft single national plan for Romania's economic and social development in 1986.

The draft plan for 1986--the first year of the next five-year plan period--stipulates a continuation of the process of intensive development of industry, agriculture and the other branches of the national economy.

The draft plan for 1986 is based on the studies and programmes on the development of research and a sustained expansion of the technological progress in all the economic sectors. It also creates conditions for an adequate development of the material base of education and the other social and cultural activities, health protection, for an improvement of the territorial organization and the urban development of localities.

The fact was considered that the materialization of the 1986 plan provisions would ensure a further development of the productive forces, enhancing the national wealth and, setting out from this, the material and spiritual standard of living of the people as well as an enhancement of the standard of welfare and civilization of the whole nation in general.

The Executive Political Committee established that the draft single national plan for Romania's economic and social development in 1986 be submitted to debate by the plenary meeting of the CC of the RCP.

The Executive Political Committee also analyzed a report on the fulfillment of the labor productivity plan in industry, construction-assembly and transports over 1 January-30 September, 1985. The data presented show that although the level of labor productivity went up over the first nine months of the year, a series of economic ministries have not implemented all the stipulations of the plan in this domain.

In view of a more sustained enhancement of the labor productivity and improving the organization and rate-setting of production and labor, the Executive Political Committee examined and endorsed a bill that, with the due improvements, will be subject to public debate and then to approval by the Grand National Assembly.

Looking into the report on providing products and controlling their quality and the activity carried out in metrology over the third quarter of 1985, the Executive Political Committee decided that the problems in the report should make the object of in-depth debates in the government that should take all the due measures in view of further improving the activity in the field.

The Executive Political Committee also examined the programme on self-management and self-supply in view of a good supply of farmfoods and industrial consumer goods to the population over the 1 October, 1985-30 September, 1986 period.

The programme stipulates a rise in sales as well as provision of the due stock, a diversification of products and an improvement in the technological and quality standards of the products.

It focuses attention on enhancing the vegetal [as received] and animal production in view of ensuring an adequate supply to the population, raw materials to the industries and meeting other demands of the national economy.

The Executive Political Committee decided this programme should be debated by the plenary meeting of the CC of the RCP and then sent for endorsement by the Grand National Assembly.

The Executive Political Committee has established that the plenary meeting of the CC of the RCP shall be held over 13-14 November.

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CSO: 2020/40

ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES LAO AMBASSADOR'S CREDENTIALS

AU151320 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1303 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES, 15 Nov, 85--On 15 November President Nicolae Ceausescu of the Socialist Republic of Romania received Thongsavat Khaikhamphithoun, who presented his credentials as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to Romania.

Handing over the credentials, the ambassador conveyed to President Nicolae Ceausescu warm friendly salutes and best wishes on behalf of the Lao party and state leaders.

The address presented by the ambassador highlights the relations of friendship, solidarity and collaboration between Laos and Romania.

Receiving the credentials, President Nicolae Ceausescu thanked for the wishes conveyed to him and, in turn, addressed comrades Kaysone Phomvihane and Souphanouvong the best wishes of good health and personal happiness as well as progress and welfare to the friendly Lao people.

The address of President Nicolae Ceausescu shows that by working widely for a successful construction of the new system, Romania is developing its collaboration and cooperation with all the socialist countries, the developing countries, with all the states in the world, irrespective of social system, based on fully equal rights, a strict observance of the national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in the domestic affairs and mutual advantage. It is in this context, reads the address, that goes Romania's permanent preoccupation with developing the relations of friendship, solidarity and collaboration between our parties, governments and countries, both in the bilateral plane and in the international life, in the advantage of the Romanian and Lao peoples, in the general interest of the cause of socialism, collaboration and peace throughout the world.

President Nicolae Ceausescu wished the Lao ambassador full success in fulfilling his Romanian mission, assuring him of the full support of the State Council, the Romanian Government and of his own support.

After the solemnity President Nicolae Ceausescu talked with ambassador Thongsavath Khaikhamphithoun, that proceed in a cordial atmosphere.
[sentence as received]

Ilie Vaduva, minister of foreign affairs, and Dumitru Apostoiu, secretary of the president and of the State Council, attended the solemnity and the talks.

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CSO: 2020/40

ROMANIA

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE SENT TO FIDEL CASTRO

AU201150 Romania SCINTEIA in Romanian 27 Oct 85 p 5

[Text] To Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba [CCP] and president of the Councils of State and Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Havana:

Dear Comrade Fidel Castro: On behalf of the RCP Central Committee, the State Council and the Government of the SR of Romania, the Romanian people, and on our own behalf we convey to you, and through you to the fraternal Cuban people, warm, friendly greetings on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the SR of Romania and the Republic of Cuba.

The importance and great significance of this event is demonstrated by the achievements attained during the past 25 years in developing many-sided relations of friendship, cooperation, and solidarity between our parties, people, and countries. We highly value these achievements and we are determined to promote further the increased development of the Romanian-Cuban cooperation in the interests of our peoples, socialism, freedom, peace, and progress throughout the world.

We rejoice at the successes attained by Cuba in building socialism and we wish the Cuban people to achieve new and important successes in the year of the third CCP Congress, for the continuous flourishing of their homeland.

Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general and president of the SR of Romania and Constantin Dascalescu, prime minister of the Government of the SR of Romania.

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CSO: 2020/40

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

ROMANIANS REQUEST ASYLUM--Munich 18 Nov (DPA)--Officials of the Bavarian frontier police discovered two Romanian escapees on the Yugoslavia Express Sunday evening. The two men, aged 21 and 22, had hidden in the roof compartment of a train car. They requested asylum, the police said on Monday, without giving any more precise details. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1252 GMT 18 Nov 85] /9738

DEPARTING SPANISH ENVOY--Bucharest AGERPRES 19 Nov, 85--President Nicolae Ceausescu of the Socialist Republic of Romania received, on 19 November, Jose Maria Alvarez de Sotomayor y Castro, ambassador of Spain in Bucharest, on a farewell call, at the end of his mission to Romania. A talk was held on the occasion in a cordial atmosphere. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1752 GMT 19 Nov 85] /9738

DEPARTING NORWEGIAN ENVOY--President Nicolae Ceausescu today received Borre Merless Riise, Norway's ambassador in Bucharest, on a farewell visit in connection with the end of his mission to our country. The talks which took place on this occasion were held in a cordial atmosphere. [Text] [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1600 GMT 12 Nov 85] /9738

KIM IL-SONG THANKS CEAUSESCU--To Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general: Allow me to express my sincere thanks for the most cordial greetings and wishes you extended to me, on behalf of the RCP Central Committee, the Romanian people, and on your own behalf, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK]. I express my belief that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties and people of our countries will grow, strengthen, and develop continuously in various fields, in keeping with the agreements reached during our meetings and talks. I extend to you sincere wishes for great successes in your and your people's activity devoted to the implementation of the 13th RCP Congress decisions and to building a comprehensively developed socialist society. Kim Il-Song, general secretary of the WPK Central Committee. [Text] [Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 12 Nov 85 p 3] /9738

CSO: 2020/40

YUGOSLAVIA

SAWPY PRESIDIUM TO NOMINATE FEC MEMBERS

Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by Dragan Lazarevic]

[Text] The Socialist Alliance, for the first time, is to organize the preliminaries for nominating candidates for president and members of the Federal Executive Council, thus performing its constitutional obligation under amendment 5.

The Social Compact on the Implementation of Personnel Policy in the Federation, adopted in 1976 and renewed in 1981, records this constitutional right and obligation, specifying that the preliminaries for nomination are regulated by an order issued by the SAWPY federal conference. However, such an order has never been adopted. At a session scheduled for 6 November, this is to be done for the first time. The SAWPY central committee's presidium will do the honors, resorting to statutory authority to issue an order in emergency situations instead of the federal conference, provided--of course--that subsequent approval is forthcoming. The preliminaries involve taking the initiative and proposing possible candidates; as a rule, the process should begin 6 months before the expiration of the terms of office of the FED president and members.

The draft order which members of the presidium will examine Wednesday, mentions that SAWPY republic-level and province-level conferences are supposed to initiate nominations for these offices. In this way, the nature of SAWPY as a front will be expressed more broadly, and the selection of individuals for these significant social offices will be included in overall electoral activity. This also means that all proposals ought to be subjected to the judgment of the public. At the same time, reports of the initiative are forwarded to federal-level agencies of sociopolitical organizations and to the country's presidency, which nominates a candidate for FEC president under the constitution. This procedure is also in harmony with article 348, section 2 of the constitution.

Throughout the proceedings, of course, the accepted principles and criteria of personnel policy are to be applied. Some of these are mentioned explicitly in the draft order; foremost are, for example, the candidate's contribution to the development and functioning of the political and economic system of socialist self-management, to the strengthening and further development of

brotherhood, unity, and equality among the constituent peoples and ethnic groups, to the enhancement of the country's external and internal security, and to the consistent realization of constitutionality and legality.

Candidates are supposed to be persons who are proven in terms of work, expertise, and politics and are capable of performing these offices. Persons who enjoy a reputation throughout the country, not just in their own surroundings, should be nominated. Likewise, there needs to be a general conviction that the candidate will successfully accomplish the programmatic tasks of the FEC during its forthcoming term of office.

If an additional term is proposed for individual candidates, the rationale must include an appraisal of the candidate's contribution to the accomplishment of FEC tasks during the current term of office.

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CSO: 2800/69

YUG SLA

DISPUTES OVER ORIGINS OF ETHNIC GROUPS AIRED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1813, 29 Sep 85
pp 29-31

[Article by Milorad Vucelic: "Yugoslavia Without Slavs"]

[Text] The Battle of Kosovo was nothing other than an out-and-out fratricidal war, one of the first in the Balkans. Turks were involved in it and fought one another. Then after that the Serbs, i.e., Turks, enslaved themselves, i.e., the Serbs, that is, Turks. The activities of the hajduks were nothing other than pure social revolt and unrest. The Turks, i.e., Serbs, fought one another exclusively because of class differences.... The events in World War II and the massacres did not amount to fratricidal warfare at all, as our history books have so far asserted, but a conflict between implacable enemies: Goths, Sorbians, Illyrians, Wends, Trojans, Thracians, Bogumils--Muslims, Caucasian peoples and tribes....

Any Yugoslavia is an artificial creation to a great extent, since altogether differing peoples without anything in common live in it. The very name Yugoslavia and all those stories about some Yugoslav idea is something that someone tricked us into and passed off on us! It is an out-and-out scandal for our anthem to be called "Hey, Slavs!" What Slavs in Yugoslavia is the song about when there are none in Yugoslavia? It is paradoxical, but true that our peoples are alone in having an anthem which refers to someone else than themselves.... We face, that is, far-reaching "new" conclusions and "discoveries." The essence is that we must understand that there are no Slavs in Yugoslavia!

The Slovenes have been an autochthonous people on several occasions already. Once they were assigned to Scandinavian sources, on another the Etruscans were the ancestors of the Slovenes, but recently the Slovene, or Etruscan-Wendish poet Matej Bor, probably carried away and inspired by his relative who bears the same name, the Scandinavian Niels Bohr, has attempted to "prove" in KNJIZEVNI LISTI, which is published by DELO in Ljubljana, that the Slovenians go back to the Wends, who settled in northern Italy back about 1000 BC. What this means in practical terms is that the Slovenes are already nearly 3,000 years old and they have no connection whatsoever with the South Slavs, that is, nothing whatsoever to do with their settlement in the Balkan Peninsula in the middle of the 6th century.

The Serbs Are Turks

At a scholarly meeting in the Monastery Decani Skender Rizaj, representative of the Kosovo Academy of Sciences (a professor at the School of Philosophy of Pristina University), presented the thesis of the non-Slavic origin of the Serbs, i.e., he asserted that the Serbs are a small Turkic tribe from the Caucasus. In addition he emphasized that Cyril and Methodius were Jews and that the Orthodox had special privileges in the Turkish state...!

The now-celebrated expert on ethnogenesis Spiro Kulisic attempted at one time to find and establish a connection between the Montenegrins and certain Caucasian tribes, all of this to the purpose of completely separating the Montenegrins from the South Slavs and the Serbs in particular. And now a problem arises. A great showdown of "scholarship" is anticipated between Rizaj and Kulisic. After all, Rizaj's "innovation" shows that along with the Montenegrins the Serbs also came from the Caucasus, which means that once again they are closely related. How unpredictable are the pathways of science....

It is well known that somewhere around the thirties the Croats were pure Goths according to Kerubin Segvic. The Croats have also been Iranians. It is also well known that there have been attempts to separate the Serbs together with the Croats from the other South and Balkan Slavs in this Iranian variant. It is also well known that the Serbs have at one time or another also had a terribly comic figure, as the historians put it--Sima "Lazin" Lukic. This political fighter, who dates from the turn of the century, argued in his pamphlets that the Serbs are one of the oldest peoples and the Serbian language is the oldest language. The word Muhamed is a Serbian word, since it consists of "muha" ["fly"] and "med" ["honey"]! Recently, Milic of Macva or of Zvezdara ("the greatest Orthodox painter") asserted that the Serbs, i.e., Sorbians, have been here and in the world in general since time immemorial.

The Macedonian "experts" from time to time create a type of ideology which calls for the roots of Macedonianism in the most ancient past. Price's Trojans now fall among all these "discoveries."

The attempts of Savic "Stedimlja" Markovic to make red Croats of the Montenegrins are exceedingly well known. (To be sure, this theory remained within the limits of the Slavic origin of the Montenegrins.) Theses have also cropped up, but they have died out somewhat in recent years, about how the Bosnian Muslims are the descendants of the Bosnian Bogumils. Doctoral dissertations have even been announced in Germany on that topic.

A clear conclusion follows from all we have said: It seems that no one wants to be a Slav!

The well-known Slovenian historian Bogo Grafenauer wrote the following in TELEKS of Ljubljana concerning these "scientific theories":

"Historians are surprised by the persistence with which several dilettantes have for the last 20 years attempted to consolidate the picture of a different beginning of Slovenian history, just so the Slovenes would be something special

and distant in their sources from the other South Slav peoples. Matej Bor," Grafenauer says, "is not the first academician who has wanted to win 'fame' with forgeries. The Italian Wends were in fact settled in northern Italy around 1000 BC, but their language has nothing at all to do with the Old Slavic or Slovenian language. This is really tragic, just as it is a tragic fact that the 'court poet of the revolution' has become entangled in theories which obviously do not want any sort of historical and ethnic connection between the Slovenes and the other peoples of Yugoslavia."

A Symptom of Crisis

Our well-known linguist and academician Pavle Ivic tell us that he does not know of many theories which assert that the nationalities of Yugoslavia are not Slavs. He does not know them because those theories are so unscientific and so far outside science that scholars have no reason to pay attention to them. From the scholarly standpoint such theories are good for nothing except ridicule and mockery. By themselves they are harmless. From the professional standpoint they are simply stupid. However, from the social standpoint they are a very serious symptom. A symptom that something profound is wrong in society. As far as I can remember, Ivic says, between the two wars, or more precisely just before World War II, there was a theory that the Croats were actually Goths, not Slavs. This was a warning sign of the state the spirits were in, and we know what the result was.

Professor Ivic also alerts us to certain necessary distinctions:

"The question of the origin of a nationality is one thing, and the etymology of its name is something else. It is not certain where the name Serb or the name Croat came from. These are words which came down to us from the most ancient times. It is certain that the word Croat cannot have a Slavic root. This is debatable in the case of Serb. The name Croat is etymologically related to the similar name of some Iranian tribe beyond the Caucasus....

"The Yugoslav nationalities," Pavle Ivic says, are "Slavs above all in their language. And that language has come down directly from generation to generation from the very ancient times of the primitive Slavs to this very day. That is obvious. However, this does not mean that the composition of those nationalities did not incorporate other elements which happen to be at the places where they settled at that time. In ancient times the Illyrians, the Thracians, the Celts and who knows what others lived here, and they were mostly Romanized. They took over the Latin language while the Romans ruled these regions. Aside from that, the Romans settled on their borders veterans of their legions from various parts of their empire who had a duty to defend the border against the barbarians.... The blood that flows in our veins, then, comes from the Britons and Syrians of that time, the inhabitants of the Crimea and the inhabitants of far-off Morocco, people from the most widely differing parts of the Roman Empire. With the coming of the Slavs a process began whereby the newcomers merged with the population that was already here, and this process ended mainly with adoption of the language of the newcomers, the Slavs."

Competition Among Nationalists

Ivic explicitly asserts that these matters are well known in science and that there is nothing there that would create an electrified atmosphere, at least not from a scholarly standpoint. "These theories are far from any sort of scholarship and always have an irrational and ultimately political background. They seem to crop up when something is wrong in society, or, to be specific, in the Yugoslav community. They are a warning signal of the moral erosion of Yugoslavism as an idea."

At a meeting on patriotism today which was held recently Radomir Komatina presented the following assessment:

"The Montenegrin separatists not only dispute the common ethnic origin of Serbs and Montenegrins, but quite often would have us believe that the Montenegrins are not even Slavs at all. This is a rehash of the theory of the well-known fascist-Ustasha ideologies of Sekul Drljevic and Savic 'Stedimlja' Markovic. Now, once again in Slovenia, various theses about the Wendish or Etruscan origin of the Slovenes are being passed off as scientific discoveries. These are not new discoveries. Between the two wars and during the Independent State of Croatia there were theories about the Gothic or Caucasian-Iranian origin of the Croats. Obviously the nationalists in our various nationalities are competing to prove how their nationality is not of purely Slavic origin, or that it has little or no kinship at all with the other nationalities of Yugoslavia."

It is obvious that the basic inspiration of these "scientific discoveries" is mainly the breakup and disunification of Yugoslavia. The nationalists and separatist forces are obviously looking for scientific legitimization of their bad politics. While on the agenda of the seriously divided world today there is the problem of its democratic linkage and coming together, here in our small space, in spite of and in the face of that basic problem of the world, people are trying to make the differences as great as possible, to create virtual chasms between our peoples, which are irrefutably related. Here again we find ourselves way out of step with the basic trends and problems of the civilized world.

Respecting the fact that historical analogies are unreliable and often even altogether inapplicable, we have to recall a certain pattern in the emergence of the irrationalistic ideologies, which as a rule insist on an ancient historical past, ignoring at the same time the historical achievements in their own development. We perhaps need to recall that the fascist ideology was mainly based on the most ancient history and furthered unscientific arguments and ethnogeneses. The fact is ignored that so much that is essential has happened in those 2,000 or 3,000 years of history that whatever happened in that more ancient history has become almost irrelevant. The emergence of these extremely irrational elements in our consciousness is a pernicious and altogether disturbing indicator.

Several very serious scholars even feel that the emergence of ideologies of this kind and of "scientific discoveries" was much less dangerous on the eve

of World War II than today. Those were then the echoes of fascist insistence, which were able to survive on the historical scene and to produce consequences only with the force of an alien fist and foreign bayonets. But how do we account for the insistence today on the non-Slavic origin of our nationalities? And how is it that this is very much our own authentic and "normal" phenomenon? The question arises whether this determined insistence on the non-Slavic origin doesn't result from the disappointing emergence of Big Brother, the largest Slavic people, on the historical scene in the 20th century?

In the Service of Separatism

Sound-thinking people agree that the emergence of these social tendencies, ideologies and scientific discoveries is anachronistic and irrational and that nothing good can come of it in the future.

How is one to explain the fact that differences among the nationalities in the Balkans and in Yugoslavia seem to have been much smaller at the outset of this century than today? The idea of Yugoslavia and of Yugoslavism has proven itself to be the only one which can bridge certain ethnic and historical differences and possible chasms. This idea in fact was realized under particular historical and political conditions. The question is this: Under what conditions and what sort of conditions are we living today, and who is it who wants to show and prove that our destiny has not been and is not a common destiny and that accordingly at every moment everyone can turn wherever he likes and to whatever side?

Finally, all these processes of historical legitimization and ethnogenetic "concealment" of separatistic policies which do everything to demonstrate as markedly as possible the singularities of their particular nationalities may also be private and arbitrary efforts until they begin to affect the communications systems, the schools, the universities, until they flow over into a mythology, which quite often has even held entire peoples in its thrall during certain periods of time.

Perhaps some of the trouble is caused by an excessive fear of assimilation by certain nationalities? Openness, more highly developed communications, the abundant flow of ideas and cultural influence in various directions cause great nervousness in all those who are sensitive and oversensitive about their nationality. And they shudder more and more at what we and in fact the world have in common. Finally, what justification can there be for that fear when assimilation and unitarianism are not an ideal that has been officially proclaimed or that offers any realistic danger?

On the Stupidity of Intelligent People

Professor Sima Cirkovic has reminded us that the critical mentality is indivisible and that therefore we cannot accept the accuracy of the answers we are sometimes given, even though the things sometimes appear to be harmless. The effort to instill gullibility and to resort to conscious or surreptitious speculations cannot be allowed to go without punishment (we will cite as an example only the discovery of Troy in Gabela). The instilling of gullibility

and the conditioning of the public to accept various things which are arbitrary and unfounded has its price, which sometimes has to be paid in some other and more painful case.

In agreement with our scholars and reasonable people that these "theories" and "scientific discoveries" are nonsensical and often far from sound common sense, we must still recall in conclusion the words of admonishment from the philosophers Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in "The Dialectic of Enlightenment":

"One of the lessons of Hitlerian times is that of the stupidity of intelligent reflection. The Jews denied the possibility of Hitler's rise with numerous expert arguments even when his rise was as obvious as the light of day.... Intelligent people felt that fascism was impossible in the West. Intelligent people have everywhere made the work of barbarians easier through their stupidity. It is judgments which provide direction, which are farseeing, forecasts which are based on statistics and experience, assertions which begin with the words 'Well, I guess I know what I'm talking about,' which are meretricious, final and solid statements.... Intelligence becomes superfluous as soon as the power of the rules of the game is no longer obeyed, but the move is made toward the outright taking of power."

Perhaps we can draw from these words a message and a moral, or at least a certain anxiety?

[Box, pp 30-31]

Sima Cirkovic: Aggressive Dilettantes

People with extravagant opinions about certain historical topics crop up in all times.... What we find in their creations are fantasy unrestrained by any sort of intellectual discipline, spontaneous or conscious neglect of the rules of the scientific method, usually a very poor stock of knowledge or one-sided information, and extreme moral indifference.

Whereas historians by trade feel an intellectual and moral obligation to say about many things that they cannot arrive at a reliable judgment, since the sources do not afford the necessary basis, the dilettantist creators of "alternative theories" are not aware of scruples of this kind and rush in uninvited to fill the gaps which are left after the efforts of serious scientists. The survival and duration of "theories" of this kind do not depend on the value and force of argument, but on publicity, so that the question of the response they get is almost more interesting than the question of the people who created them. The more we concern ourselves with them, the longer nonsense of this kind will persist. The response awakened by this kind of "historical judgment" indicates the lively interest in certain topics on the part of those who create public opinion. For some reason these questions are more alluring than others.

It is easy to see that very often the motives for launching conceptions like this do not lie in pure intellectual curiosity, but in a desire to have an

impact on the consciousness of contemporaries, to make oneself heard, and also to further and somehow historically legitimize current divisions and strains. History at this point becomes only an excuse, and the real topic lies in what is topical at the moment. As in the case of numerous other forms of abuse of history, here again private intellectual games of the dilettante are deformed into a sinister means of subjugating the human mind, into a means of exerting control over people. This accounts for such aggressive efforts at publicity and official recognition. That is why those who launch these "theories" want more than anything else to involve serious scientists in discussion of them, to get into encyclopedias, to be recognized as a party on an equal footing in the Solomon's deliberations of certain of our politicians!

I think that the response given to these "theories" and "theoretical notions" shows the immense ignorance and gullibility of many people who hold positions in our mass media. The citizen today is flooded with information of various kinds, to a considerable extent with information that concerns the historical dimension of his existence, and he is unable to critically master and assimilate that information.

In this connection I see an ever stronger need for a systematic effort and enlightenment, at equipping people to make critical judgments and to think correctly in historical terms. The ability for independent, clear-headed, objective and critical thought about history contains a better defense against the "theoretical conceptions" we have been talking about and the manipulations of various kinds than an individual refutation of "ideations" which do not even deserve the attention of serious people.

7045

CSO: 2800/34

YUGOSLAVIA

CONTROVERSY RESUMES OVER NATIONAL ANTHEM

Critique of Proposed Changes

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 3 Nov 85 p 12

[Unattributed commentary: "Anthem Without 'Hey'"]

[Text] The Yugoslav Assembly's Commission for Formulating a Proposal for a New National Anthem (such is the official title) has finally proposed its "definitive formulated position" to the Federal Chamber. The tradition of semi-explained and half-baked attempts to get the upper hand on the national anthem "Hey You Slavs" has been enriched with yet another compromise solution. Specifically, the commission proposes to replace the chant "Hey You Slavs" at the beginning with "O Yugoslavs," and to replace the phrase "may the Slavic spirit live, live long" in the fifth line of the first verse with "may the spirit of freedom live, live long."

What do we gain and what do we lose thereby, and is the whole commotion worth so much effort and money?

If we casually ignore the improbable persistence of attempts over the decades to change the national anthem, despite the clear verdict of the people, it remains for us to examine this new attempt as though it were the first. Our minisurvey of several musicians and musical specialists has brought out doubts as to the possibility of retaining the melody if another syllable is added to the sung verse, especially a syllable with different stress ["Hej Sloveni" versus "Jugosloveni"]. As every American knows, "Jugo" consists of two syllables, whereas "Hey" is one syllable. Next, from a poetic standpoint, both content and message suffer: it is faintly odious to compliment a population which has borne its name (Yugoslavs) only 67 years, and which has not yet become a single people, on the grounds that "the spirit of your forefathers still lives," whereas the forefathers in question--in any case--were called differently (Serbs, Croats, etc., or the general name South Slavs).

By this solution, furthermore, the opponents of the present national anthem put themselves in a contradictory position: the non-Slavic population of Yugoslavia was cited as one of the key reasons for change.

The old text of the national anthem was consistent, at least. With the loss of the phrase "Slavic spirit," there is even less consistency. We can split hairs about whether such consistency makes sense "in the present political moment." Tradition stubbornly holds out, by definition, against time and nothingness.

A proposal of this kind, in the spirit of the time, is a wholly typical Yugoslav solution: a compromise to which no one will adhere. The folk, in those precious moments when the national anthem is sung aloud spontaneously, will continue to sing the old text, which is easier for singing and has become a part of the collective "ear."

Once again, the job of changing the Yugoslav national anthem has been done sloppily.

Wording Ridiculed

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 85 pp 2-3

[Letter to editor by Vladimir Krastic]

[Text] Everybody is aware of the fact that a great deal in our society is politicized. However, few could have guessed that such would be the case with the national anthem. Unfortunately, the proposed changes come out of a forum and are not an artistic creation, as even a layman can see.

The original impulse of the author of the poem "Hey You Slavs" derived from the romantic yearning for the cultural and political unification of all Slavic peoples, including the subjugated peoples, known as Pan-Slavism. Accordingly, the beginning of the first verse--"Hey you Slavs, the spirit of your forefathers still lives"--has had an almost magical capacity for South Slavs for enhancing morale and patriotism for the sake of encouraging resistance to a conqueror, especially in the last war, when fascism had the monstrous intention of destroying all the Slavic peoples. Therefore, to eliminate the phrases "Hey you Slavs" and "may the Slavic spirit live, live long" is to destroy the basic idea and message of the national anthem. As can be seen the song stripped down rejects even the proposed changes as unnatural.

In the first verse, we know that the author had in mind primarily the Slavic peoples enslaved at the time, who were convulsively struggling for their freedom and existence. Accordingly, the proposed change to "O Yugoslavs, the spirit of your forefathers still lives" makes no sense today; in present circumstances, when the country is united, free, and independent, and especially when it is socialist, such a message is extremely pessimistic, not to say destructive.

On the other hand, "Slavic spirit" has been changed to read "spirit of freedom," although the only logical change would be to match the first change: "the Yugoslav spirit." However, since such a change is technically unfeasible, both changes wind up being sheer mistakes, both poetically and thematically.

It is incomprehensible for a country such as ours, which has produced great poets over the centuries and which today obviously possesses large numbers of gifted artists, to lack the strength and inspiration for decades to come up with a good, universally-acceptable text to go with the familiar melody of "Hey You Slavs." I doubt that artistic importance is in question. Rather, I regard the influence of political and bureaucratic factors and criteria to have taken precedence over genuine artistic considerations.

/8918

CSO: 2800/65

YUGOSLAVIA

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS HEAD SEES NO IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Oct 85 pp 13-17

[Interview with Zdenko Svete, chairman of the Commission for Relations With Religious Communities of the Executive Council of the Croatian Assembly, by Nenad Ivankovic: "The Church Is No Alternative"; date and place not specified]

[Text] A conversation with Zdenko Svete does not signify only a meeting with the new chairman of the Commission for Relations With the Religious Communities of the Executive Council of the Croatian Assembly (appointed in early September after Ivan Lalic, who had become to some extent legendary, went into retirement), but also with a man who has had a very rich diplomatic career, who was ambassador to Morocco and to the Vatican, who has also gone through a coup d'etat and who at that time was at one point forced to lie with a few other diplomats on the lawn in front of the Moroccan royal summer palace while bursts of gunfire whistled over their heads. He has held diplomatic posts in Washington, New York and Prague, and today when a man talks to this veteran of diplomacy he immediately spots that lengthy "ambassadorial career" in what we might refer to as his energetic politeness and eloquence.

"To serve as a diplomat at the Vatican is after all something specific," he says and recalls his meetings and conversations with several popes and with the "inevitable" Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican state secretary, and his right-hand man, the Vatican "minister of foreign affairs" Silvestrini. "Along with everything else," he explains, "the Holy See is also an important moral factor in world politics, so that a diplomat always has an opportunity to conduct fruitful conversations there concerning all current world issues. I often did that myself, and I can say that in such conversations the Vatican has always had views similar to or identical to those of our country, which is in fact normal, since it itself has basically adopted the principles of the policy of nonalignment. I think that President Tito's role was important here, since after his meeting with Paul VI a deep understanding developed between them with respect to resolving current outbreaks of crisis in the world and international problems, and the Vatican even began to make an appearance as an observer at conferences of the nonaligned."

Finally, Svete goes on to say, "Paul VI, with whom I talked on several occasions, always emphasized Tito's role in international relations and Yugoslavia's role in the movement of the nonaligned and in the United Nations. He

once said that he considered our country one of the main elements and factors for European security and cooperation. I talked with John Paul I, who succeeded Paul VI, but soon died, about many essential matters, and I can say that as a former patriarch of Venice, that is, practically on the Italian-Yugoslav border, he was very familiar with our situation; especially relations between the two neighboring countries, including the border problems. I remember that on one occasion he said of the Osimo agreements that they constituted one of the most important high points of postwar politics and diplomacy. Now the church boundaries have been brought into conformity with government boundaries, which, of course, goes beyond the limits of dealing only with church affairs. In this connection I cannot but say that even as a bishop that pope strove to improve the position of our ethnic minorities in Italy, to preserve the Croatian and Slovenian languages in parishes where our people were predominant, to preserve our ethnic culture and legacy, etc.," Svete said.

DANAS: What were bilateral relations like between the Vatican and the SFRY during your stay in Rome, especially concerning church affairs in Yugoslavia?

Svete: As is well known, when it signed the protocol (1966) the Holy See accepted the fact that the SFRY Constitution and its laws are the framework in which the Catholic Church can legally operate, while the SFRY promised to guarantee the freedom of church activity within those limits. But for the most diverse reasons the church in Yugoslavia has not always behaved accordingly, so that at time interventions in the Vatican were even necessary. Naturally, those were not always the most pleasant topics for conversation, but interventions were indispensable, since the desire in having influence of the Holy See brought to bear on the church in Yugoslavia, and that influence can be considerable, was to avoid direct confrontations as the consequences of certain unacceptable political activity on the part of a segment of the church hierarchy and rigorous penalties under law.

Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul I, along with their collaborators, showed a great deal of understanding for such requests, and from time to time, especially when it was a case of certain explicit and pronounced political activities either on the part of a segment of the church hierarchy or individual priests, they did take specific steps. All in all, then, during the papacies of Paul VI and John Paul I, while I was ambassador in the Vatican, relations with the Holy See were characterized by cooperation filled with mutual understanding and trust.

Svete was also ambassador to the Vatican at the beginning of Pope John Paul II's papacy, but when he left the Vatican he was unable to make his farewell visit, since the latter was in the hospital after the attempted assassination. But, as he says, John Paul II did later receive him on a courtesy call (in March 1982); such a visit usually lasts some 10 minutes, but this time it became an "authentic conversation" lasting all of 40 minutes.

The conversation was very serious, Svete said, and it concerned international conditions and the domestic church and activities of one segment of its most

responsible people. "John Paul II gave me the impression of a man who shares the assessment of his predecessors concerning the international political importance and role of the SFRY and of a pope who respects and maintains Yugoslavia's position with respect to global political circumstances in the world. I also got the impression," Svete said, "that he was aware of the development of the church situation in our country and paid particular attention to it. In any case I think that Yugoslavia, both as a state and as a particular church situation, is in the foreground of this pope's interest, and in the years which have followed that conversation this has in fact become evident in a way."

Going on to speak about Pope John Paul II, Svete recalled various details: "The conclaves which were held in the Sistine Chapel, when the entire area of that jewel of Renaissance art was cordoned off, and the windows and doors of dwellings in the neighborhood were sealed shut, and the cardinals went through electronic search procedures as they entered the conclaves so that none of them could 'smuggle in' any means of communicating with the outside world. He recalled how no one, neither in the Curia, nor among the diplomats, anticipated that a Slovak pope would be elected, how a diplomatic scandal broke out at that time since someone obtained the content of reports which the Italian ambassador at the Vatican had sent to his government in which there were quite a few views unfavorable to and critical of the Vatican, and finally the installation speech of John Paul II, in which even then one could see certain new elements in the future ecclesiastical and political strategy of the Vatican. And today it is being carried out with evident repercussions on the policy of local churches. You are aware of the assessments, the reactions and the controversies in this connection within the church and in the world." Svete said that when the diplomatic corps was presented to the new pope he impressed almost all the diplomats as a "strong and decisive individual who knew how to get his ideas implemented" and of a man who also knew how to make a joke (he once said to our ambassador: "You and I seem to be the only persons who represent something special in the Vatican," alluding to the circumstance that both are Slavs and both from socialist countries).

As for relations with our country, Svete said that Pope John Paul II was at that time more or less repeating the same formulas as his predecessors "and it seemed that there would not be any essential shifts either with respect to the government or with respect to church policy" and that along both lines he would continue the policy of his predecessors.

DANAS: Not long after that the pope was delivered an invitation to visit Yugoslavia. What are the prospects for that actually happening?

Svete: Perhaps it would be good to say first how the pope came to be invited to our country in the first place. During visits made by Cvijetin Mijatovic, who at that time was chairman of the SFRY State Presidency, to Italy and then also to the Vatican, he invited John Paul II to visit Yugoslavia as a sign of good development of intergovernmental relations and of the maturation of general conditions for such a visit to take place. So, it was a question of having the visit take place at a suitable moment, and it was assumed, at that time it seemed to be a real possibility, that our domestic church, especially

the most responsible segment of its hierarchy, would behave as though the pope's visit to Yugoslavia meant not only a constructive step in relations between the SFRY and the Vatican, but also in relations with the domestic church. In essence the expectation was that our church hierarchy would make the necessary efforts for the pope's visit to take place in that spirit. What happened instead was just the opposite: the behavior and activity of certain very responsible churchmen made conditions difficult for the pope to come. The impression was unavoidable from the way they behaved that in actuality they did not wish that visit. In any case, the government has been making sincere efforts in favor of the visit, and it will take place when the conditions are brought about so that it could yield the desired constructive results. We should also add that the Holy See has been given prompt and precise explanations in connection with this question, and the impression is that they were received with a certain understanding.

DANAS: Recently, more precisely last July, our country was visited by Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican secretary of state. What did that visit accomplish?

Svete: Casaroli's visit was an occasion to talk a bit about all matters, both foreign policy and the church. These talks were very detailed and open. In any case, Cardinal Casaroli is well known as a prelate who has a great deal of experience concerning Yugoslavia, and in fact on behalf of the Holy See he was personally the architect of the protocol (which we have already mentioned). But he is not only the formulator of the policy of the Holy See toward Yugoslavia (the foundations of which were laid down in the protocol), but also one of the main figures and formulators of what is referred to as Vatican policy toward the East and its global world and European policy.

As far as the talks go, it should be said that they were fruitful, that positions and views were clarified on both sides and that the personal assessment of Cardinal Casaroli is that relations between the church and the social community in Yugoslavia have every chance and opportunity to develop constructively through sincere dialogue and that problems will be resolved in the same manner, to which he personally and on behalf of the Holy See gave full support. Certainly, this visit was one of those moments which one expects to be followed by very specific steps and moves. It would not be out of the way to say that in the 40-year history of relations with the church in the SFRY this society has in its legal arrangements, purposes and intentions shown the greatest breadth, goodwill and openness for all possible issues to be resolved in the best possible way.

DANAS: Does that mean, especially the latter, that present relations with the church are rather complicated and in certain aspects even very strained?

Svete: Yes and no. With the church as a whole, with the members of the church in particular, quite certainly not. But it has to be said that relations are both very complicated and stratified. You see, relations are normal and good with most of the church hierarchy, that is, with a sizable portion of the bishops, not to mention the priests. Indeed with a certain number of the most responsible churchmen cooperation is exemplary on all those matters which are of common interest. Here I am thinking of those church dignitaries and

priests who do not politicize religion, nor do they instrumentalize it to achieve certain political goals. And as a matter of fact there is no need for that, since in our country the church has enough room within the limits of the constitution and law for authentic ecclesiastical and religious activity. This is definitely shown to be the case by, say, the church events, either of the Catholic or Orthodox Church, which have taken place in the last decade in our republic (from Solin, Nin, Marija Bistrica, Jasenovac ... to Djakovo). They truly would not have been possible nor successful, especially the largest of them, if this social community in SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia had not taken a benevolent attitude, if I can so put it, and had not made every effort to create all those conditions--from traffic control to sanitary and health facilities, transportation and the like, without which such an event could not have taken place. This is presumably one of the things that clearly states that this society feels that the religious conviction of citizens does not contradict its fundamental values by any means. Finally, religious people, like other citizens, are also builders and defenders of brotherhood and unity, this country's federal system, its democratic system of self-management, and its independence. Precisely because those who are religious accept those fundamental values, their participation in religious events does not in any way contradict the interests of our sociopolitical community. Of course, it is an altogether different thing when such events are politicized by certain prelates and a certain number of the priests and by very few, but very militant groups of believers. Then problems arise, and I have to say that such problems do exist and relations in this connection are not only complicated, but sometimes even strained.

What is more, politicization of religion has recently been on the rise more and more, and certain churchmen seem even to be competing in this.

DANAS: Would you give us some examples of that kind of instrumentalization of religion and the church?

Svete: There are quite a few, but I would first say that I am not responsible for the political interpretation of those problems, but for enforcing the law in this area. Of course, when people operate outside the limits of the constitution and law matters usually do take on their political dimension, and I have in fact my opinion about this, which is that such activity offers the ideological foundation for politicizing religion and the church. In that sense I think that one of the key examples is identification of Croatism and Catholicism or, in the case of the Orthodox Church, of Serbism and devotion to Saint Sava. But let us remain in the area of Catholicism. You see, that identification is not explicit, that is, no one is literally saying that only Croats are Catholics, or that only Catholics can be Croats. But at the same time they want to interpret all of Croatian history, and then certainly the present and future as well, exclusively from the angle of clericalism, so that in the end it turns out that without the Catholic Church this people would not have existed, and accordingly that without it it will not exist in the future either. This, then, is the source of that alleged right--and that an exclusive right!--of the church to act on behalf of the interests of the nationality, to be a sociopolitical factor, in practical terms to be a kind of political "soul" of the people. That ultimately leads to identification of Catholicism

and Croatism, with all those consequences which we experienced more than 40 years ago as one of the greatest tragedies in our history. Such interpretations are, of course, not borne out either by scholarship or history, as can quite obviously be seen if one takes up not some Marxist work, but Starcevic or Radic, say.

Then, of course, there is also the attitude toward Stepinac, as an altogether logical consequence of that ideology of "blood and soil" (some people in the church gladly make use of the latter phrase), and that comes down to building the Catholic Church in Croatia on the political principles advocated by Stepinac. Where those principles lead is stated most clearly by the tragic balance sheet of the so-called Independent State of Croatia. Of course, such a conception is without prospects in historical terms and is condemned to failure, but under the very complicated socioeconomic and international conditions today, a certain number of followers in the country and also certain spokesmen abroad find it to be an extremely reactionary "alternative," and it objectively turns out to have a destabilizing effect on our multinational and multi-faith community. Although I am convinced that its ultimate goals cannot be realized, this still does not mean that it does not cause unrest, evil forebodings, and a negative political and ideological thrust in young people who know too little about this or who have been indoctrinated with clericalism.

DANAS: Isn't the ever more explicit opposition of religion and atheism on which some churchmen have been insisting is one of the crucial watersheds of society, along the same line?

Svete: Certainly, a quite conscious effort is being made to accomplish a division in our society that ultimately would always lead to a division of people: into those who are religious and those who are not. Some clerics even go so far as to proclaim this fundamental contradiction of the present-day world, and they see the resolution in a clash between religion and atheism, in some future political-ideological battle over the entire planet. It is clear that world outlooks are by no means the important thing here, but much more what they symbolize. In the case of atheism, referring to our context, it means above all the secularism of this society and the system of socialist self-management. The alternative which is basically offered comes down to negating on the one hand the secularism (that is, negation of everything that the contemporary world has achieved in its progress from the French Revolution, certainly with respect to human rights and liberties), and on the other a negation of socialism.

That is why today atheism is being attacked with real fanaticism at all levels and in all connections. One might well ask what kind of fighters for democracy these people are and how their democracy would look, but it is precisely those who attack everything that is not religious (and therefore not authorized by them) who also appeal the most to democracy when they are condemning an elementary human right: the freedom to believe and the freedom not to believe. It is of no help here that some of them might say that this right is not condemned when at the same time they explicitly anathematize one of the consequences of that right (atheism). I assume it is clear that ultimately it comes to the same thing.

So, the problem does not lie in differing views of the world. Such there have always been and there always will be. That is normal. The real question is whether those who hold them operate as factors for integration or disintegration in this society. Do they adjust their particular interests with the general interests of society or not. What actually happens in society is above differences in outlook on the world or certain other differences, so that the interest and responsibility ought to be held in common. It is therefore a pertinent question: What is actually meant by the slogans of those who say that it is a question of an ideological conflict to the death?

Perhaps it is not out of the way to recall that those who have fallen under the influence of such ideas and that kind of policy have in some cases evolved to the point of the most extreme nationalism and chauvinism, approaching even the verge of terrorism, as evidenced by certain recent court cases.

DANAS: Can it be said that a certain sectarian attitude toward religious people which unfortunately does exist in our country is partly the consequence of that kind of behavior, and then also of the attitude that religious people are second-class citizens in our country?

Svete: You see, sectarianism does exist in our country, there are cases of excess and of a practice that is aberrant from the proclaimed social principles concerning religion and the church, and it needs to be fought just as resolutely as clericalism. Of course, such cases may embitter and distress even the most well-intentioned priest or bishop, cause him to react, sometimes even out of proportion. But that is understandable.

However, it is a quite different thing when someone proclaims that deviant practice (in the end that is not the case in this region alone!) to be the fundamental policy of our society and derives therefrom arguments about religious people as second-class citizens. This is a deliberate policy which is aimed at guaranteeing the hierarchy the legitimate right to represent the believers, to act as their agent, and that as a separate social group, from which there follows also a separate (parallel) social and political program, and so on. And that means nothing other than a division of society on a religious basis, along with the church's ambition to participate in government and social power. And that is in contradiction to the fundamental commitment of this country.

DANAS: Fine, so where do you see the way out of this vicious cycle of problems and tension which at times may be, and indeed are, very serious?

Svete: I will answer very briefly: This society asks nothing of that part of the church with which we actually have the problems I have spoken about than that it do what has been done by the ordinary members of that same church, numerous priests, and indeed even the bishops: that they sincerely accept the fundamental values of this society, for which atheism truly is not any kind of trademark. Finally, the country's independence is neither atheistic nor theistic, nor are brotherhood and unity, nor this kind of federalism, nor this kind of self-management. I am profoundly convinced that in such a case we would easily and successfully overcome all other difficulties, since a climate

would be created of mutual trust and goodwill, which at present unfortunately does not exist in a part of our church hierarchy.

DANAS: Finally, I would ask you to say what happened to the request of the Conference of Bishops of Yugoslavia to the SFRY State Presidency for Christmas and All-Saints' Day to be holidays?

Svete: First I must say that the bishops mistakenly sent their request to the SFRY State Presidency. This lies in the jurisdiction of the republics. As far as the initiative itself is concerned, I believe that such matters should be dealt with with patience and goodwill and in the same spirit with which these holidays became widely accepted national customs. Incidentally, actual practice and life itself provides answers to this. It is quite certain that we would move more rapidly toward a satisfactory solution if the church hierarchy did not politicize those problems, which are objective, and if it strove to find its solutions in the normal process as these questions come to a head. Politicization and pressure are counterproductive in this regard.

DANAS: How do you look upon the other requests which church representatives have submitted and which have to do with the presence of priests in prisons, the Yugoslav People's Army, hospitals and the like?

Svete: You see, these requests usually do not honor the complexity of our federal community and everything that follows therefrom, and to that extent they are devoid of an awareness that it is very difficult to adopt a uniform measure on these matters at the level of the entire community. But as for the prisons and hospitals, say, quite a bit has been done in practice, and it is quite possible to arrange things still better on the basis of present legislation. However, there have been cases when this was dealt with on the basis of the house rules in some hospital, but certain church officers behaved very aggressively (and there were even incidents), which certainly made things more difficult. That is why it is very important for the church hierarchy to exert an influence on its religious officers in what it says and by its own examples so that they would behave in keeping with their calling--tolerantly and in a spirit of dialogue, and then all these matters will be dealt with more favorably in practice.

7045

CSO: 2800/31

YUGOSLAVIA

CONTROVERSIAL HISTORICAL WORKS REVIEWED, CONDEMNED

Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian No 436, 5 Oct 85 pp 18, 20

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "Who Is Laying Mines With History"]

[Text] Dedijer consoled his biographer Milo Gligorijevic, who was unhappy because his text, teeming with "bold" assertions, had been shortened, as follows: "Not to worry, we set 20 land mines there. They dismantled 5, there are 15 left"!

Today it might unfortunately be asserted that our history is a field of scholarship that truly more and more resembles the "mine field" Dedijer was talking about, in which one is threatened any moment with the danger of stepping on a "mine" which will "explode" many long-standing perceptions of old and new Yugoslavia, of the party, and of the National Liberation Struggle. The inclination to seek the way out of present difficulties in the past instead of the future has made it possible for certain historians to enthrone a new trend--the "demystification" of the revolution at any price as well as "poking about" on the margins of global historical development in the hope of finding "crowning proof" about who was most successful in deceiving whom over the last 50 years or so. We are getting an ever more rounded picture of the tragic "losers" of history, that is, the ethnic leaders, political parties and movements which were the victims of the "games behind the scenes" both before and after the revolutionary changes. The most far-reaching and thereby the most dangerous "mines" are those which all but assign the roles of "executioners" and "victims" to entire nationalities, seeing the roots of today's controversies in those "historical injustices." Much like the lamentations about the sufferings of the Croatian people back in the time of the mass movement, there have been increasingly frequent articles saying the same thing about the Serbian and Slovenian nationalities. Although it does not occur to anyone to dispute the tragic episodes of history, nor indeed the genocide of the Serbian people in two world wars, it is an unacceptable method to relieve its political representatives, especially the court, from all responsibility for running the government, when their method of ruling often went all the way to class and ethnic repression. In writing about the most recent book of Dr Veselin Djuretic, "Saveznici i jugoslavenska ratna drama" [The Allies and the Drama of the War in Yugoslavia], which was immediately proclaimed a "provocation of the first order in the writing of history," but also a disturbing mirror of the times in which it was written, Dr Djordje Stankovic feels that this kind of cover-up of

certain events and "demystification" of the revolution is actually an attempt to create a "new myth" without real historical facts or scholarly verification.

Djuretic's study is certainly not an isolated example of the revision of contemporary history, but only the most complete treatment of what has been recorded in the arguments of indeed in episodes taken out of context in, say, Dedijer's "Novi prilozi..." [New Contributions to a Biography of Josip Broz Tito] and in what he related to Gligorićević, Cencić's "Enigma Kopinic" [The Kopinic Enigma], Kljakic's "Dosje Hebrang" [The Hebrang Dossier], "Stranacki pluralizam ili monizam" [Party Pluralism or Monism], of Kostunica and Cavoški, Terzić's "Slom Kraljevina Jugoslavije" [The Downfall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], and a sizable number of articles in professional journals or papers presented at meetings of scholars. Those "land mines" of Dedijer's in those writings did not "fall out of the sky," but round each other out and together comprise a complete system revealing the great "conspiracy" of the Comintern and its Yugoslav "affiliate" in frustrating the activity of the legally established parties and in inhibiting the natural process of integration of the Serbian nationality. The striking similarity in the views of some of these historians becomes still clearer if we see who the various publishers are, who served as the historian's reader, who has been promoting which studies where and in what way, what kind of "kibbitzing" have they provided in their zealous encouragement of their spokesmen, and, every bit as important, who is thoughtlessly looking the other way from the cases of irresponsibility in the writing of history which have not much to do with scholarship. If present trends continue in deprecating the National Liberation Struggle and its leaders, we soon might see the day referred to ironically by Dr. Dusan Biber when he said that if we already have "committees for marking and protecting the names of individual revolutionaries," we will soon have to establish a "committee for protection of the revolution" as well!

Let us look, then, at the perception of Yugoslavia's international, war and postwar period which these authors have created in the last year or two. Let us start with the way they see relations among the nationalities and the conflict between the Serbian bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisies and party leaders of other nationalities of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Vlado Strugar, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, concerned himself with this topic at a meeting of scholars on "The Writing of History...in the Light of Current Ideological Controversies" in Zagreb, advocating at the same time "reevaluation" of the questions raised. Strugar first noted that in the Marxist writing of history the period of the monarchy in Yugoslavia is referred to as the rule of the "Great Serbian hegemony and the defensive resistance of the oppressed nationalities." After Serbia's victory in the war, it fell to its rulers to "shape and hold on to what had been achieved," which suggests the conclusion that talks were conducted on an equal footing with representatives of the countries entering the new state. He then mentions that the two negotiating parties displayed "abruptness" and "hastiness," and that led to creation of the kind of state that it was. This is to "forget" the lack of international recognition of the newly created State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as well as its being under threat from Italy and the internal "threat" of revolutionary events. One of Strugar's key arguments is that ethnic equality depended upon the given economic structure throughout the entire state. That is, the Serbian

bourgeois had the advantage in government power, but the Croatian and Slovenian bourgeoisies had the advantage in the level of development of their national economies and in their large finance capital. According to Strugar, the more highly developed, i.e., Croatia and Slovenia, had the advantage. The Serbian bourgeoisie, which was the nominal ruler, had nothing but "trouble" in running the government. In other words, all it got from government was uninterrupted difficulty, and it had no benefit from it. Thus the conflicts between unitarianism and federalism are oversimplified using the categories of the government and the economy, and the class nature of authority, in which the economy obtains its base of support, is forgotten. The result of this reduced approach is that the problems of ethnic inequality did not even exist in Yugoslavia. How then to explain the movements of the masses with ethnic aspirations precisely in the more developed parts of the country, Croatia in particular? Nor can we take seriously Strugar's assertion that "federalization of the monarchy began" when Croatia was made a banovina, and the bourgeoisie would have "continued it if it had not been cut off by the world war and then altogether thwarted by the revolution." This argument suggests the conclusion that the revolution was actually unnecessary. Strugar is overlooking here the fact that unitarianism was still at that time the lasting conception for organization of the state, that is, that the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, because of the necessity of resolving the "Croatian question," merely opened up room for more appropriate inclusion of the Croatian bourgeoisie in the processes of maintaining and reproducing the system of government in Yugoslavia. The way in which this member of the academy looks at historical reality is still clearer when we point to his position that the ethnic peculiarities were played up with skill at political agitation and at manipulation of the masses, whereas they did not have so very much basis in real life. That is why unity without multinational mediation was given as a "historical necessity," and it will be "realized more completely insofar as the ethnic peculiarities are neutralized and eliminated."

Strugar's arguments about the interbellum period have been taken up lock, stock and barrel by Veselin Djuretic in his book "Saveznici i jugoslavenska ratna drama," and he interprets the problems in interethnic and political relations merely as a product of Austro-Hungarian, Italian and Bulgarian "anti-Serb monkey business." Djuretic believes that the Serbs, in spite of numerous alternatives for realizing the concept of statehood for the nationality, selected the solution that went beyond the nationality, the Yugoslav "ideological counterbalance to Serbism, which halted the process of their constituting a state on their own." "Rotten compromises," Djuretic continues, stirred up the anti-Serb disposition of "ethnically amorphous segments of the people," creating the possibility that chauvinistic and foreign competitors would take advantage of that situation to form new ethnic individualities on an anti-Serb basis. Further, the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement showed that "forces were concealed behind the federalist concept which conceived Yugoslavia as a freer framework for their ethnic expansion at the expense of others, their ultimate goal being disintegration of the community." Djuretic places the CPY along with the extreme right in the context of anti-Serb policy. According to him the suggestion made at one time by the Comintern about the need to break up Yugoslavia received its "confirmation" in the establishment of both the Croatian CP and the Slovenian CP. Djuretic derives the very term "myth of Great

Serb hegemony" and "ethnic oppression" from "Comintern propaganda," whose ultimate purpose was supposedly to muddle interethnic relations as much as possible. Thus in his "alchemy" this historian has strangely come to wonder why, for example, the "anti-Serb manipulations" had great influence even in Macedonia, opposing the wave of liberation from the Balkan Wars and World War I."

Historian Ljubisa Ristovic also addressed charges against the CPY's policy between the wars at a recent scholarly meeting in Belgrade on the topic "The Founding Congress of the Serbian CP." In a long paper with the provocative title "'Oppressive' and 'Oppressed' Nationalities," Ristovic asserted that the establishment of the ethnically oriented parties opened the doors to federalization of the party and he disputes the well-known explanation of Blagoje Parovic to the effect that the Serbian CP was not formed (it was established in May 1945!) because the masses in Serbia had not demanded it, and that is understandable, according to Parovic, since the Serbian people was not an oppressed nationality. If one accepts Parovic's assessment, Ristovic says, the CPY did an injustice to the party organization in Serbia, since party members in Croatia and Slovenia were in a privileged position. The reason was supposedly that neither the objective nor subjective opportunities existed within the limits of the given policy and programmatic commitments, nor in terms of the composition of the people making up the leadership, to place the "Serbian national interests on the same level with the national interests and rights of the nationalities of Yugoslavia." Ristovic feels that only in December 1942 does one see in a statement by Tito any essential change in treatment of Serbian communists, when it is stated without any reservations whatsoever that the Serbian nationality had taken up the fight in order to resolve its nationality question on an equal footing with the other peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia. One particularly dubious argument here is that "after the Fourth Congress in 1928, and in the period of the dictatorship, there was a striking removal of Serbs from leadership of the CPY." Ristovic altogether overlooks in this connection the fact that the factional struggles which had caused changes in the leadership were finally brought to an end, while on the other hand he is especially intrigued by what torment drove Vladimir Copic and Blagoje Parovic to renounce their Serbian national origin and to declare themselves in party biographies as Croats. Here Ristovic poses the dilemma of whether they were ashamed of being sons of the "oppressor" nationality or whether this was the only possibility of "remaining in the leadership"? In his conclusion of polemics conducted through the newspapers he let it be known why he is now exposing the "taboo" concerning the neglect of Serbian interests by putting the question: "And what if reality has already verified my arguments?"

The April fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia has been the concern of several historians, but Terzic's methods are an "exploit" without precedent in our historiography. If certain historians can be accused of being malicious and tententious, of covering up or of playing games with their sources, Terzic has gone them one better. According to an extensive analysis by Dr Ljubo Boban, historian, in an attempt to prove Yugoslavia's betrayal by the Croat nationality and its political representatives, Terzic has quoted certain sources inaccurately or indeed simply invented them! On the basis of an extremely doubtful so-called Strictly Confidential Circular Letter of the Croatian Peasant

Party dating from 1939 Terzic has launched the argument that the most important Croatian political party, in spite of the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, was pursuing the line of a deliberate shattering of Yugoslavia. What is more, that same circular letter was for him also the "platform of the mass movement in Croatia in 1971."

For an "altogether singular method of exposition and philosophical interpretation of historical events" one has to go back again to Djuretic. It is his view, often justifying the behavior of Kosta Pecanac, Dimitrije Ljotic, Milan Acimovic, Milan Nedic and especially Draza Mihailovic, that Serbian fascism did not have even the elementary motives for its continuation, and it was leftist propaganda that "sponsored the phenomenon" of that term becoming a "worldwide curiosity, as a phenomenon without reasons." The Chetniks, Nedjicites and Ljoticites, who collaborated openly with the occupier, Djuretic asserts, did so in order to preserve the "biological substance of the Serbian people," and that their pathetic concern for the nationality was "much more moral" than the creation of Quisling regimes in certain other occupied countries. Djuretic directs particular attention to Draza's Chetniks. Mihailovic's movement, Djuretic "discovers," was a dangerous rival of Tito's Partizans from the very outset because of its express antifascism. Communist tactics and propaganda are exclusively to blame for the fact that Draza's followers did after all end up in open collaboration and the old curiosity shop of history. So, every Partizan action, to paraphrase Djuretic, brought bloody reprisals by the Germans, so that the Chetniks had to enter into open conflict with that kind of "leftist extremism" since it was the ultimate cause of genocide. And in order to be able to do that effectively, they asked for weapons from someone who had an adequate supply, that is, the occupier. That is why the possible landing of the Western allies in the Balkans did the greatest harm to the Germans and, because of their firm ties with the Soviets, the Partizans. These two factors which were otherwise opposed, Djuretic says, had a marked "common basis" in their anti-Chetnikism. In order to give this appropriate underpinning, Djuretic quotes a telegram from the Supreme Command dated March 1943 which said that they should not oppose the Germans, but that now the most important task was to "destroy the Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic." The Partizans were allegedly aided in this by "Masonic ties" with certain German officers. Tito, according to Djuretic, also thwarted Draza in his last attempt to prove himself in combat against the occupier. That is, when the Soviet units entered eastern Serbia in agreement with Tito, the Chetniks "recalled" their great "Russophilism" and turned their rifles against the Germans, who had been their protectors until the day before. Having figured out the purpose of this sudden "sobering up," Tito made an agreement with the Soviet command that they would disarm Draza's units post haste, which was in fact done.

The author of the book also devotes a great deal of space to the "Jajce turning point," that is, to the revolutionary postulates which are today the basis of Yugoslav federalism. Djuretic takes a number of examples to assure his readers that the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] decisions did not resolve the question of constituting the Serbian nationality as a state, but at the same time through an erroneous interpretation they opened up the processes of disintegration of the Yugoslav community. He

cites as an example the resolution from Djakovica Malesija about annexing Kosovo and Metohija to Albania, but says nothing about the fact that Tito and the Supreme Command reacted vigorously and immediately to that position.

The vision of the attitude of the allies toward the "civil war," as Djuretic refers to the conflict between the revolution and counterrevolution on Yugoslav soil, is also indicative. The Comintern and the Soviet Government, according to this author, knew exactly what they wanted the whole time and what methods to use in obtaining it, while at the same time they pretended to be "naive" vis-a-vis the British and Americans. The key to the success of the Partizans, according to Djuretic, lay in the clever maneuver of "conquering Serbia" with the help of the Soviets and preventing at any price a greater involvement of the Western allies in the mopping up operations. The British, Churchill in particular, are portrayed as inconsistent and poorly informed about what was happening in Yugoslavia, and even as being burdened with the need to resolve the "Croatian question." They were also "taken in" by the myth of the "Serbian Chetniks" and "Croat Partizans." Djuretic says of the Americans that they had a better understanding of the communist danger, but for strategic reasons and division of spheres of interest, they left the initiative in the Balkans to the British.

There are also interesting sketches of the principal actors in the Yugoslav drama as individuals. Thus Stalin is referred to as the perfidious arranger of wartime events, since off in the wings, from the first to the last "scene," he was precisely pulling the strings behind all events. By contrast with him, Churchill played the role of the "capricious English lion," who felt "compassionate toward Tito." Roosevelt allegedly displayed "pro-Serb sentimentalism" and accepted solutions of the "Serbian question even outside the limits of Yugoslavia."

Djuretic made his greatest effort to "demystify" Tito. Whereas he portrays him on the one hand as an obedient spy of the Comintern, on the other he constantly emphasizes his wiliness and resourcefulness in eliminating his political adversaries and creating the propaganda image that would be the decisive factor in the commitment of the allies to the National Liberation Movement. Tito, Djuretic says, consciously built up his own myth. To that end he successfully "concealed" his ethnic identity for a long time. He revealed it only in 1943, when propaganda had already represented him as a "warrior without fault or fear." Toward the end of the war, as Djuretic tells it, Tito had already "grown" to world stature, having taken on the strength of a "half-myth"--a "half-man," and the people based its vision of an "idealized future" on him. Compared to Tito, Djuretic says that the turning point for the confused Draza Mihailovic was in February 1943, when, slightly drunk, he numbered among his enemies "the Partizans, the Croats, the Muslims, and the Ustashas," and only then did he mention the axis forces. That was how his myth about resistance to the occupier from the beginning of the war up until 1944 came to disappear almost entirely.

The thesis of the continuity of nationalism within the Croatian CP is certainly among the greatest deceptions in the writing of history. It is Dedijer and Kopinic who have made the greatest contribution to laying that "mine" in

recent years, while their crown witness is certainly the silent Hebrang. That is why the story in "Rat i mir Vladimira Dedijera" [Vladimir Dedijer's War and Peace] has all the features of a suspenseful detective novel in which the brave researchers "in the belly" of the Croatian party are constantly facing a day-and-night, but invisible enemy. But nothing can make them waiver. Let us therefore look at what Dedijer dictated to the pen of Milo Gligorijevic. Namely, Dedijer assures readers that he was "looked upon favorably" by the political leadership of Croatia up to the moment when he published in NIN the two wartime telegrams concerning Hebrang, which he had obtained by some accident from Kopinic's mysterious archives.

Trouble, Dedijer says, lay in wait for Kopinic himself upon the publication of certain of his documents making it evident that "the Russians concealed from Tito the messages about Hebrang's behavior" and that "the Russians were preparing him even during the war for what happened later," seeing him as a competitor to Tito.

Whatever the case, by publishing the "truth" about Hebrang, Dedijer and Kopinic found themselves under "attack" by certain politicians of the "firm hand" school. In addition to Stevo Krajacic, it was none other than Vladimir Bakaric who brought these "threats" in Croatia; he is supposed to have proclaimed Dedijer a "enemy of Croats." The climax of the "detective novel" is when all at the same time someone "set a fire" in the vicinity of Dedijer's and Kopinic's houses, and then "conducted a search" with a police escort even into the archives of material for "Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita."

For Dedijer and his team of helpers it obviously was not enough to portray Bakaric as a "protector" of Hebrang, but they also included Miroslav Krleza in the "circle of nationalism." He was charged with having taken the view back on the eve of the 1935 elections that "there was no revolution," that the CP had fallen apart, of having demanded that the party not go on alone, but operate as the "left wing of the Croatian Peasant Party." Dedijer asserts in conclusion that Krleza is today becoming a substitute and a means of "strengthening statist goals," which is the reason for "establishing a committee which would protect his name and reputation."

These are just some of the typical examples of what has been happening under cover of "demystification" on the historiographic front. When we add to all this the increasingly numerous newspaper articles, open letters and public statements by individuals and groups in which increasingly heedless and aggressive assaults are made on the basic achievements of the Yugoslav revolution, on brotherhood and unity, not stopping short even at the crudest attacks on the person of Josip Broz Tito, then the organized and ever more systematic assault on the foundations of Yugoslavia's constitutional order is outlined ever more clearly. The climax of these hostile statements in the recent period was the open letter by Dobrica Cosic published in KNJIZEVNE NOVINE, in which he makes a number of insinuations at the expense of Comrade Tito. And while actually these statements are not surprising--they all, that is, originate with individuals who for a long time have been in conflict with the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia--it is an astounding fact that they have all been able to publish their books and articles or make their public

statements in publishing houses and newspapers and public platforms financed with public money.

Alluding to those who by their tacit approval have actually been aiding the creation of "new myths," one Slovenian historian a few years ago refused to attend any "firefighting" gathering about "cases" in the writing of history, but sent the organizers this message: "Let the dog be caught by whoever let him off his chain." And today, after so much time, that "catching" is no longer a simple matter at all because of the ever thicker "mine field" of deceptions of various kinds.

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